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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis narrates the history of the University of Miami Justice for Janitors 
campaign of 2006 as a local movement disclosing the immanent contradictions of the 
financial expansion ongoing in the capitalist „world-system‟ since the 1980s and 
manifest in the financial crisis of 2008.  Involving janitors, university students, 
faculty, clergy, union leaders and the local activist community in a nine-week struggle 
that culminated in a theologically resonant hunger strike and an ultimate union 
contract for the workers, the campaign introduced a new dynamic of collective 
resistance into Miami‟s civil society, including novel institutions and discursive forms. 
The thesis views the campaign as an individual lens on—and instance of—the 
contemporary regime of capitalist accumulation, using event-level history to focus on 
a set of concrete efforts at resistance that both flowed from and locally modified the 
advancement of neo-liberal social policies in the city.   
The central argument is that the campaign laid potential foundations for a 
novel historical bloc in Miami by creating a loosely-networked community of actors 
committed to a social wage, embedded in specific relations of the market society, 
rooted in deep connections to material life, and capable of exercising political 
influence vis-à-vis elite actors.  Drawing upon Christian symbolism, clerical support, 
and the initiative of workers in pursuing a three-week hunger strike, the campaign 
built up a broadly Catholic community of faith to disclose a conflict between the 
exigencies of material life and the commandments of capitalist instrumentality.  Its 
discourse and practice opened up possibilities not only for better wages, benefits and 
working conditions for the janitors but also for new shared conceptualizations of the 
meaning of the campus space as locus for the unfolding possibilities of time.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Campaign 
The history of the University of Miami Justice for Janitors campaign of 2006, a 
local movement building upon the limits of a regional, national and international 
process of financial expansion ongoing in Miami since the 1980s, offers a significant 
window on the immanent political contradictions—and ultimate limits—of that 
process.  The Miami janitors‘ campaign succeeded by building a broadly Catholic 
community of faith to launch a confrontation between the exigencies of material life 
and the logic of capitalism that managed to destabilize—if only briefly—the effective 
centrality of neo-liberal rationality in the city.  In the ―market‖ space between the 
―upper‖ and ―lower‖ levels of the local society, the campaign‘s networked 
constituencies built up an historical bloc that articulated a conflict between productive 
and property relations, made possible an improbable contractual victory against the 
campaign‘s corporate adversary (represented by former United States Health and 
Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala), and launched a series of subsequent social 
organizing campaigns that are still rippling through Miami‘s civil society. 
One of my strong research interests is in local social conflicts as instances or 
expressions of the world-systemic contradictions occasioned by capitalist productive 
relations.  This involves attention to how social movements of diverse origin and 
objective can be understood to express and bring together the specific problematics of 
expanded material reproduction, on one hand, and accumulation by dispossession, on 
another (Harvey 2006: 65) as coeval and contradictory dynamics of larger capitalist 
processes.  This general research orientation also involves attention to how processes 
of commodification come to impact the conditions of daily material life and the sorts 
2 
of resistances that emerge from within its relations (Harvey 2006: 113-14; Braudel 
1981: 28, 559). 
I focus on the Miami Justice for Janitors campaign in this paper for a variety of 
reasons.  In the first case, I believe it to mark an excellent example of a localized 
resistance to capitalist productive relations; the campaign includes and expresses the 
general contradictions inherent in the moments of dispossession, productive expansion 
and commodification that have characterized historical capitalism as an overall trend.  
In a second case, the campaign provides a window on the relations of the U.S. regime 
of accumulation (Arrighi 1994) in the Caribbean Islands, Central America and South 
America, in whose governance Miami historically has played a leading role.  In a third 
case, the campaign gives insight into more specific strategies of regionalization 
adopted by the U.S.-based regime of accumulation to cope with the ‗signal‘ crisis of 
its hegemonic relations beginning roughly in 1970 (Arrighi 1994), a processes that 
propelled Miami to new status as a significant node in the political economy of the 
Caribbean Basin beginning in the 1980s (Sassen and Portes 1993; Grosfoguel 1995).  
Fourth and finally, the campaign offers a window on the emergent relations of 
Miami‘s local civil society on the eve of a long economic downturn now playing out 
as the global financial crisis of 2008.  The campaign is, both structurally and 
historically, I believe, a site of sociopolitical significance and one whose utility as a 
lens on a larger set of world-historical dynamics may only grow with time.
1
 
                                                 
1
 There is also an element of biography in my choice of focus: I am a J.D. 
graduate of the University of Miami, where, ―[a]lthough I studied jurisprudence, I 
pursued it as a subject subordinated to philosophy and history‖ (Marx 1859).  I lived 
in Miami Beach from August 2001 through May 2004, during which developments 
and conditions preceding the campaign—including the November 2003 Free Trade 
Area of the Americas Ministerial Conference and demonstrations in downtown 
Miami—influenced my understanding of the conditions prevailing in local civil 
society and their relationship to the regional and global polity. I served as a legal 
observer for the National Lawyers‘ Guild during the demonstrations and was present 
3 
Born at the end of a process of global financial expansion that heightened the 
city‘s significance as a center of international trade and financial services, the Miami 
Janitors‘ campaign brought together a diverse constellation of social actors commonly 
impacted by the rise and consolidation of Miami as a central ―place of flows‖ for 
global capital, commodities and labor.  Property values soared during Miami‘s period 
of growth, and real estate developers reaped enormous rewards from newly built 
luxury housing and office space, but real wages remained relatively flat.  The poor did 
not share in the fruits of autumn.  Miami‘s period of expansion drove processes of 
financial rationalization, proletarianization and spatial displacement as the city‘s 
increasing wealth attracted new immigrants to fill an ample demand for service work 
but increasingly relegated these workers to live in remote suburbs or urban slums due 
the same upward pressures on property values that drove ―urban renewal.‖  Just as a 
new rentier class was rising in Miami as a result of the prodigal growth in local 
property values, a substantial mass of Miami‘s very poor population was barely 
subsisting on service-based work.  This relatively invisible group‘s poverty was 
broadly accepted as a mere ―externality‖ of otherwise reasonable and efficient 
―market‖ processes until the community that constituted the Miami janitors‘ campaign 
came to actively question those processes‘ legitimacy. 
The campaign—involving janitors, university students, faculty, clergy, union 
leaders and the local activist community in a nine-week struggle that culminated in a 
hunger strike and an ultimate union contract for the workers—introduced a significant 
new dynamic of collective resistance into Miami‘s civil society that indicated both the 
limits of the community‘s flexibility in the face of late neo-liberal restructuring and 
the emergence of new local social formations protective of workers, prevailing 
                                                                                                                                            
on hand for both a parade of labor unionists and activists and the exercise of extreme 
police repression that characterized those mainly fruitless regional trade discussions. 
4 
community values and the city‘s social spaces.  Emanating from the most apparently 
improbable of sites—a Cuban-American community in South Florida—the campaign 
thus marks one instance of a signal that productive relations had come into conflict 
with property relations, broadly defined. 
At bottom, the 2006 Miami janitors campaign not only proved to the U.S. labor 
movement that Miami‘s traditionally Republican and politically conservative Cuban-
American community was fertile ground for new organizing.  The campaign was also 
highly suggestive about the potential of strong Catholic communities of faith 
contained within predominantly Protestant and secular polities to unsettle the 
historical alignments that make a neo-liberal hegemony possible.  The first 
achievement mattered because the effects of union-discouraging ―right-to-work‖ laws 
prevalent in the southern and southwestern states of the U.S., combined with the 
strong Democratic party affiliations of the U.S. labor movement and the ethnocentric 
assumptions and prejudices that have historically burdened attempts to organize new 
cohorts of workers in the U.S. had led conventional wisdom in the labor movement to 
dismiss the Cuban-American community in Miami as quite possibly the least likely 
place for a successful organizing campaign (Amernick 2006; Brakken 2006).  The 
second achievement mattered because Marxist literature has often dismissed the 
attitude of religion generally,
2
 and of Catholicism specifically, as essentially distinct 
from ―the attitude of the philosophy of praxis,‖ with Gramsci maintaining that 
―whereas the former maintains a dynamic contact and tends continually to raise new 
strata of the population to a higher cultural life, the latter tends to maintain a purely 
mechanical contact, an external unity based in particular on the liturgy and on a cult 
visually imposing to the crowd,‖ typically reacting to actual attempts to bring the 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Marx 1843. 
5 
church closer to the people as instances of heresy (1971: 397).
3
  The campaign, along 
with the historical achievements of liberation theology and contemporary signs of 
increased ‗social‘ attentiveness from the Vatican,4 suggest that this characterization 
may need to be adapted to account for the nature of current Catholic attempts to 
maintain the community of the faithful and for the actual politicization of particular 
local instances thereof.  In short, the campaign helped to unsettle a number of long-
held prejudices going back to the ―common sense‖ of the U.S. labor movement, on 
one hand, and to merely dogmatic understandings of the roots of dialectical 
materialism, on another. 
By building the social movement behind the campaign‘s work, the labor union 
that coordinated and funded it behaved as a progressive—though self-interested—
vanguard, providing millions of dollars in research, staffing and infrastructure to the 
campaign but ultimately leaving the engagement of stakeholder groups free to play out 
according to its organic logic in each instance.  This ―laissez-faire‖ approach to social 
                                                 
3
 Gramsci does not completely close his mind to the revolutionary 
contributions of Christianity, of course, but he does tend to place them in the past, 
viewing the church of the early 20
th
 century as essentially conservative of the status 
quo.  In one acknowledgement of the church‘s progressive capacity in the past, for 
instance, Gramsci observes that ―both the religions which affirm the quality of man as 
the sons of God and the philosophies which affirm the equality of man as participants 
in the faculty of reason have been expressions of complex revolutionary movements 
(respectively the transformation of the classical world and the transformation of the 
medieval world) which laid the most powerful links in the chain of historical 
development‖ (1971: 356). 
4
 See, e.g., Pope Benedict XVI‘s encyclical Caritas in Veritate, issued in 2009.  
Among other things, the encyclical offers a deeply conservative critique of the socially 
corrosive influence of unbridled capitalism.  I bring up the encyclical not somehow to 
equate it with more localized or ‗grassroots‘ responses to the impacts of neoliberal 
capitalism from within the Church but to underscore the extent to which a deep 
skepticism of capitalist rationality may be understood to pervade this broad 
community of faith, in continuity with early Catholic doctrine, on one hand, and in 
response to an emerging global awareness of the social and environmental 
externalities of enterprises driven by the pursuit of profits at all costs. 
6 
organizing ultimately yielded to a more theological movement than is usual among 
first contract campaigns in the U.S. labor movement in the early 21
st
 century.  What 
emerged—including a three-week hunger strike that referenced the Passion of 
Christ—was hardly a paragon of U.S.-style secular restraint.  But the campaign‘s 
theological style should not be dismissed as a sign of a reactionary disposition or a 
weak interest in ―progress.‖  Long gone are those mist-enveloped days when 
―progress‖ was the exclusive domain of the godless.  On the contrary, what was 
precisely salient about the campaign‘s logic and history was the way the campaign 
managed to articulate specific materialist with specific spiritualist and to seek the 
organic resolution of both through actual social struggle. 
 
Methodological Discussion 
My sociological method is primarily historical.
5
  I use the campaign I depict, 
my unit of analysis, as an individual lens on—and instance of— a larger phenomenon 
of the uneven and combined development of the capitalist world-system,
6
 of which it 
is simultaneously derivative and constitutive.  That larger phenomenon, my domain of 
inquiry, is the project of ―neo-liberal‖ capitalism,7 which sought increasing freedom 
                                                 
5
 I say „historical‟ with full awareness that I am writing event-level history of a 
very recent vintage.  There is always some danger in such an enterprise, but the choice 
of „history‟ here is methodological, not thematic.   
6
 See Trotsky 1930.  See also Wallerstein 1991.  
7
 I speak in the past tense because the buck would appear to have stopped at 
some point in the late fall of 2008.  Neo-liberal arrangements seem unthinkable when 
governments throughout the world— not least in the U.S.—are nationalizing banks, 
limiting executive compensation and launching unprecedented waves of domestic 
welfare spending.  My case thus appears to speak to the world-historical conditions of 
an era that has come to a kind of closure.  Karl Polanyi‘s experience in failing to 
predict the eventual supersession and dismantlement of the great wave of early-20
th
 
century social and economic regulation that he narrated in The Great Transformation 
(1944), however, would tend to counsel against giving these moments of closure too 
much analytic weight.  Indeed, we may find ourselves in a situation much more akin to 
Henri Pirenne‘s depiction of a sort of pendular oscillation—with ―lifts‖—between 
7 
for capital through the progressive dismantling of the post-war welfare state, of social 
limitations on contractual arrangements, and of other obligations associated with 
collectively borne costs and public goods.  In an attempt at a better understanding of 
the phenomenon of neo-liberal capitalism, as both reality and discourse, I use the 
event-level history of the campaign I depict to focus on a set of concrete efforts at 
resistance that both flowed from and locally modified the advancement of neo-liberal 
social policies. 
My method thus comports with the ―singular form‖ of what Philip McMichael 
has termed ―incorporated comparison,‖8 an alternative to the use of fixed units of 
analysis for social scientific inquiry that aims instead at ―grounding the analytical 
units of comparison in the world-historical process under investigation‖ (1990: 385).9  
This methodological approach is ―alternative‖ because it ―views comparable social 
phenomena as differentiated outcomes or moments of an historically integrated 
process, whereas conventional comparison treats such outcomes as parallel cases‖ 
(McMichael 1990: 392).  I employ this approach not only to avoid reifying the 
                                                                                                                                            
laissez faire and regulated forms of capitalism (1953: 515-16), and not at all one 
characterized by any continuous trajectory of linear progression. 
8
 The late Giovanni Arrighi, who adopted McMichael‘s method of 
―incorporating comparison‖ as the methodological basis for his historically 
comparative treatment of  systemic cycles of capitalist accumulation and expansion, 
observed that ―the comparison is incorporated into the very definition of the research 
problem: it constitutes the substance rather than the framework of the inquiry.‖  In 
Arrighi‘s case in The Long Twentieth Century, the systemic cycles of accumulation he 
examines ―are neither subordinated parts of a preconceived whole, nor independent 
instances of a condition; they are interconnected instances of a single historical 
process of capitalist expansion which they themselves constitute and modify‖ (23). 
9
 McMichael‘s method is particularly compatible with Heidegger‘s concluding 
observation in an essay entitled ―The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking‖ 
(1966) that, in light of the nature of truth as alētheia, or unconcealment (i.e. 
contextualized by an ever-emergent relationality of phenomena to what does not even 
presence as such), ―[t]he task of thinking would then be the surrender of previous 
thinking to the determination of the matter for thinking‖ (Heidegger 1977, 392), 
notably to an attempt at a substantive understanding of phenomenal emergence. 
8 
(instance of the) phenomenon I analyze but also to capture its implication in a process 
of historical unveiling that is cumulative, relational and subject to progressive 
modification.
10
  By examining the campaign as a localized instance of (resistance to) 
neoliberal policy, I seek a better understanding of the real limits of the latter and a 
glimpse of those ―new superior relations of production,‖ whose material preconditions 
may be emerging—here and in multiple other social constellations—―within the 
framework
11
 of the old society‖ (Marx  1859). 
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 Methodologically, I also wish to underscore the organic and not merely 
formally comparative associations that necessarily inhere within and between the 
cases that the social sciences might seek to examine.  As Gramsci puts it in his prison 
notes on ―The Study of Philosophy,‖ ―it is not enough to know the ensemble of 
relations as they exist at any given time as a given system.  They must be known 
genetically in the moment of their formation.‖  Or, as otherwise put, ―if man is 
conceived as the ensemble of social relations, it then appears that every comparison 
between men, over time, is impossible, because one is dealing with different, if not 
heterogeneous, objects‖ (1971: 359).  As Gramsci explains, ―The individual does not 
enter into relations with other men by juxtaposition, but organically, in as much, that 
is, as he belongs to organic entities which range from the simplest to the most 
complex‖ (Id.  352).  ―Each individual is the synthesis not only of existing relations, 
but of the history of these relations.  He is a précis of all the past‖ (Id.  353).  I am not, 
in other words, interested in identifying or contributing to the construction of a 
transcendent logic across cases.  Such an ahistorical knowledge would be 
unreasonably abstract, immobile and shallow.  What is much more interesting and 
fruitful, for my purposes, is attention to the immanent logic of specific complex 
processes that mutually condition and inform the historical development of civil 
society as a whole. 
11
 Reflection on the ‗framework‘ provides a useful way to demonstrate how the 
Heideggerian (rejection of) ontology might be provisionally reconciled with Marxist 
materialism and therefore deployed methodologically in conjunction with a 
provisional Marxian epistemology.  Here it is worthwhile to observe that the word 
Marx uses to describe the relations of the old society is ―framework,‖ or the German 
Gestell.  As Heidegger points out in his essay ―The Question Concerning 
Technology,‖ this word, which names in German both what we call in English a 
bookrack and a skelton, also names the essence of modern technology: specifically, 
the attribute of ―enframing,‖ or a specific logic of knowledge production that 
Heidegger believes to approach nature by way of ―challenging‖ and appropriation to 
what Heidegger calls the ―standing reserve‖ (1977: 296-300).  According to 
Heidegger, however, the verb stellen—to set upon—from which Gestell is formed, 
―should preserve the suggestion of another Stellen from which it stems, namely that of 
9 
In the discussion that follows, I will round out this first chapter with a basic 
narrative of the campaign and a brief discussion of the theoretical perspectives I will 
deploy in its analysis.  In Chapter 2, I will analyze the campaign with a view to capital 
strategy, depicting elite (including national labor union) involvement at a level of the 
social structure Braudel described as a ‖shadowy zone, hovering above the sunlit 
world of the market economy and constituting its upper limit, so to speak‖ (Braudel 
1981: 24).  In Chapter 3, I will ―descend‖ again to an analysis of the campaign at the 
level of daily material life.  Here I will examine the campaign‘s formation from—and 
its implications for—the structures and rhythms of the several local communities in 
which it established itself and took root.  In Chapter 4, I will discuss the campaign‘s 
explicit ―politicization‖ of—and ultimate resolution within—the relations of Miami‘s 
market economy as articulated with those of a complex network of regional trade and 
influence.  In my last chapter, I will return to a brief reflection on what an 
understanding of the campaign may contribute to extant theoretical perspectives in 
political economy and critical theory. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
producing and presenting [Her- und Dar-stellen], which, in the sense of poesis, lets 
what presences come forth into unconcealment‖ (1977: 302). 
 The difference between Marx and Heidegger on this score is thus, in some 
sense, a matter of attitude toward the possibility of structural exhaustion, with Marx 
ultimately seeing enframing as an all-encompassing requisite of the historical 
‗progress‘ that his theory envisions and Heidegger seeing it as a kind of revealing that 
holds out the promise of a more original kind of revealing only insofar as it 
fundamentally demeans Dasien‘s experience of Being-in-the-world.  Viewing the 
‗seeds of destruction‘ in a non-Marxian sense, for Heidegger, is a matter of 
phenomenological seeing, in which possibilities for more ‗authentic‘ Being are 
snatched from the jaws of the process that threatens but can never fully bring about the 
systematic rationalization of everything that is.  Instead of the ‗sciences,‘ these 
possibilities reveal themselves for Heidegger in the ‗arts,‘ and especially in poetry.  
Both thinkers thus, in a sense, accept the process of enframing, Marx with the practical 
expectation that the proletariat will transcend industrialization and Heidegger with the 
understanding that, in spite of the enormity of its impacts, enframing can never 
definitively foreclose ‗aletheia,‘ the revelation of truth. 
10 
Event-Level History
12
 
The organizing and first contract campaign at the University of Miami (UM) 
did not begin until 2005, but conflict at UM over the janitors‘ low wages and lack of 
benefits began four years earlier under faculty leadership in October 2001, when the 
UM Faculty Senate began passing resolutions, directed to newly-inaugurated UM 
President Donna Shalala, recommending the university‘s compliance with the Miami-
Dade County Living Wage Ordinance.  In resolutions passed on October 24 and 
December 12, 2001, the Faculty Senate recommended that Shalala raise hourly wages 
and provide health benefits for the university‘s full-time and part-time employees and 
contract workers (Faculty Senate 2001).  Law Professor Michael Fischl, a labor lawyer 
who would later emerge as an active faculty supporter of the union organizing 
campaign, drafted the Faculty Senate resolutions after an August 2001 Chronicle of 
Higher Education article reported that UM ranked 194
th
 out of 195 in a survey of 
janitorial pay among U.S. universities (Fischl 2007; Fischl 2006; Van der Werf 2001). 
The Chronicle article had generated widespread concern among the faculty 
which the new Shalala administration, in turn, summarily ignored.  Even after an 
explicit discussion of the Faculty Senate‘s recommendations with Fischl and other 
faculty leaders, Shalala declined to make any changes in janitor compensation or 
working conditions, which were perceived to be out-of-step with Shalala‘s 
management objectives at the time (Fischl 2006).  Indeed, janitors at UM were earning 
as little as the Florida minimum wage of $6.40 an hour, with no meaningful health 
benefits, as late as March 2006 during the heat of the organizing campaign (Boodhoo 
                                                 
12
 The better part of this narrative of the campaign was first published in the 
Labor Studies Journal in 2008 in an article by the present author entitled ―Contending 
Rationality, Leadership, and Collective Struggle: The 2006 Justice for Janitors 
Campaign at the University of Miami,‖ © 2008 United Association for Labor 
Education. 
 
11 
2006f).  Although the faculty‘s protestations fell flat in the fall of 2001, the faculty 
resolutions would become useful rhetorical ammunition for student activists facing 
Shalala four years later (Amernick 2006). 
SEIU began organizing janitors at Miami Beach condominiums and at UM in 
February 2005 (BNA 2005) as part of a larger strategy to organize workers in 17 
southern and southwestern states via the Justice for Janitors campaign model (BNA 
2006s).  At an early stage in its South Florida organizing drive, SEIU enlisted the 
support of South Florida Interfaith Worker Justice (SFIWJ), a coalition of clergy and 
other members of the local faith community committed to activism on behalf of low-
wage workers and affiliated with the national Interfaith Worker Justice organization 
based in Chicago (Hawking 2007).   SFIWJ became involved in SEIU‘s attempt to 
organize workers at Miami Beach condominiums employed by Continental Group, 
including a march, involving 30 clergy activists, to the firm‘s headquarters in June 
2005 (Hawking 2007).  Continental Group‘s significant resistance to SEIU‘s 
organizing attempts resulted mainly in protracted struggle before the NLRB and 
stalemate, however (Boodhoo 2006e). 
Beginning in the fall of 2005, SEIU began efforts to reach out to students at 
UM in preparation for an impending campaign there.  Students Toward a New 
Democracy (STAND), a group formed by undergraduates to ―create an activist culture 
in a historically apathetic student body‖ at the university (Butler Volunteer Services 
Center 2007), became an obvious potential ally.  STAND was headed by student 
leader Jacob Coker-Dukowitz, whose mother is a law professor at UM (Coker-
Dukowitz 2006). The relatively new group, which was already beginning to pursue 
anti-sweatshop and ―fair trade‖ activism, came to work with the union as a result of 
the outreach efforts of SEIU organizer Eric Brakken (Coker-Dukowitz 2006; Brakken 
2007).  Himself an anti-sweatshop activist for United Students Against Sweatshops 
12 
(USAS) during his days as a student at the University of Wisconsin, Brakken had 
worked as an organizer for SEIU since 2001 and had been involved in the Boston 
janitors‘ strike in 2002 (Brakken 2007). 
With Brakken‘s help, STAND became closely allied with USAS, and SEIU 
paid for STAND‘s members to attend training in direct action at the fall 2005 USAS 
conference in San Francisco (Coker-Dukowitz 2006).  SEIU arranged trips to UM by 
students from Harvard who had been involved in the successful 3-week sit-in to raise 
the wages of UNICCO janitors working there in 2001 (Boodhoo 2006g),
13
 and SEIU 
sent student activists from Georgetown to UM in November 2005 to school the 
members of STAND in organizational tactics (Bierman 2005).
14
  Already, in the fall of 
2005, STAND had built an email list of over 300 students, gathered 800 signatures 
from the undergraduate population calling for better worker pay, set up a website and 
provided other visible evidence of a new kind of student activism on campus (Bierman 
2005). 
The campaign at UM did not begin to heat up until the following spring.  By 
then, Kim Bobo of the national Interfaith Worker Justice organization had dispatched 
Reverend C.J. Hawking, an affiliate based in Bloomington, Indiana who had played a 
leading role in the prolonged lock-out campaign against the A.E. Staley 
Manufacturing Company in Decatur, Illinois from 1994 through 1995, to work on the 
Miami campaign full-time (Hawking 2007).  Hawking had arrived in Miami in late 
summer of 2005 to supplement SFIWJ‘s existing Miami leadership by devoting her 
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 Not coincidentally, the Harvard janitors‘ campaign had also been the 
impetus for the Chronicle of Higher Education article that led to the faculty resolution 
at UM in 2001 (Bierman 2005). 
14
 The Georgetown connection came in handy later when, in the course of the 
campaign, Shalala delivered a speech at Georgetown, which was interrupted by shouts 
from STAND‘s new allies, bearing the signs of UM‘s hunger-striking janitors (Coker-
Dukowitz 2006). 
13 
40-hour weeks exclusively to the janitors‘ drive at UM (Hawking 2007).  The union‘s 
earliest action at UM was a gathering of about 25 workers, organized by SEIU staff, 
on October 6, 2005, to protest their low wages and lack of healthcare benefits 
(Athavaley 2005), but the event had little immediate impact. 
On February 1, 2006, the NLRB issued a complaint against UM‘s cleaning 
contractor, UNICCO, for surveillance by supervisors of a union meeting, 
interrogations, threats of reprisal, and requirements of written disavowals of union 
support (Graves-Goodman 2006).  Following the complaint,
15
 a strike vote was set for 
Sunday, February 26.  In an early show of support for the janitors‘ cause, 40 UM 
faculty members held a sendoff luncheon for the janitors on the university‘s central 
patio the prior Friday (Boodhoo & Bierman 2006). 
On February 26, the janitors voted overwhelmingly to authorize a ULP strike 
against UNICCO (BNA 2006a), and the nine-week partial strike began on February 
28, the evening before Ash Wednesday.  The following day, at a noontime Mass at St. 
Augustine‘s Catholic Church and Student Center adjacent to the UM campus, 
hundreds of striking janitors wearing purple t-shirts received ashes from Father Rich 
Mullen, an Augustinian priest (Hawking 2007).  Far from a random conjuncture, SEIU 
organizers and Hawking had carefully orchestrated the workers‘ walkout to 
underscore the symbolism of Ash Wednesday and the beginning of Lenten 
renunciation (Hawking 2007).  On March 5, the first Sunday of Lent, the striking 
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 The ULP strike followed issuance of a complaint against UNICCO by 
NLRB Region 12 in Miami after SEIU filed charges alleging that UNICCO suspended 
or fired janitors who support the union and spied on, threatened and attempted to 
coerce the workers (BNA 2006a).  The alleged retaliatory firing actually involved a 
janitor who spoke to the Orlando Sentinel about union organizing efforts at UM 
(Coyne 2006).  SEIU also filed NLRB charged against UM itself, alleging that the 
university deployed a discriminatory access policy to prevent union organizing (BNA 
2006a). 
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workers attended a Mass at which they received blessings from the Bishop of Miami, 
Felipe Estévez (Hawking 2007). 
With the beginning of the walkout, the faculty stepped up their support. At the 
time of the janitors‘ strike vote, about 70 members of the faculty had signed a pledge 
to support the strike in a manner consistent with their obligations as teachers; in 
practice, this meant preparation to avoid crossing the workers‘ picket lines by holding 
classes off campus (BNA 2006a).  A small core of 8 committed faculty members, 
which came to be known, tongue-in-cheek, as ―the comitato,‖ emerged as the faculty‘s 
nerve center (Pompele 2007).  During the strike, ―the comitato‖ met once a week, was 
in touch by telephone several times daily, and kept the rest of the faculty informed 
through an all-faculty listserv (Pompele 2007). This inner core included two lawyers 
(one of them Michael Fischl), a faculty administrator, a faculty senator, two 
sociologists, an internet blogger and a number of fluent speakers of Spanish (Pompele 
2007). 
In sympathy with the striking janitors, UM faculty began holding classes off 
campus on March 2 to avoid crossing picket lines (Spangler 2006).  Giovanna 
Pompele, a lecturer in UM‘s English department, worked with SFIWJ to coordinate 
alternative classroom sites off campus (Pompele 2007; Hawking 2007), using venues 
as diverse as ―churches, temples, houses and the little park off Grenada Boulevard and 
U.S. 1‖ (Spangler 2006).  In all, more than 100 faculty members honored the workers‘ 
picket line by holding more than 300 classes at alternative locations (Pompele 2007).  
Using a ―slow‖ dial-up internet connection and delegating her husband as a ―stay-at-
home coordinator,‖ Pompele also posted documents, petitions, and messages relevant 
to the unfolding progress of the campaign on her campus listservs and internet blog 
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(Pompele 2007).
16
  By providing virtual fora for strike coordination and publicity, 
faculty bloggers such as Pompele and law professor Michael Froomkin (Coker-
Dukowitz 2006) helped open new spaces within and through which the campaign‘s 
collaborative efforts would unfold. 
On March 16, mid-campaign, Shalala announced a new compensation policy 
for UM‘s contract employees; raising wages by at least 25 percent, Shalala increased 
minimum wages for cleaners a full third, from $6.40 an hour to $8.55 (Boodhoo 
2006f).  Far from deterred by this attempt to derail the organizing campaign,
17
 SEIU 
cheered the janitors‘ raise, and labor, clergy, faculty and student activists prepared for 
further escalation through a day of coordinated action (Hawking 2006). 
On March 28, clergy and students carried out a two-tiered nonviolent civil 
disobedience action that drew significant local media attention (Hawking 2007).  
Coordinated jointly by C.J. Hawking and Jacob Coker-Dukowitz, the event involved 
the blocking of traffic on U.S. Route 1 outside the UM campus, followed by a student 
occupation of the UM admissions office (Hawking 2007).  Just as 17 activists, 
including 8 union members, 6 clergy, 2 community leaders and SEIU local 11 
President Rob Schuler, were arrested by local police for forming a human chain across 
this major north-south highway, STAND member Alana Lopez announced to a crowd 
of reporters and onlookers that student activists and the campus chaplain had occupied 
the UM admissions office (Hawking 2006; Hawking 2007).  Initially supported by a 
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 Pompele‘s website, ―Picketline: Social Justice and Democracy in Miami,‖ is 
still a significant source of news and information about organizing for the city‘s 
burgeoning labor and social justice community, available at 
http://picketline.blogspot.com/. 
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 Labor law professor Michael Fischl observed how interesting it was that, 
despite the fact that Shalala‘s mid-campaign pay raise may well have constituted a 
clear unfair labor practice (ULP) under Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor 
Relations Act, the union ―went everywhere and said, ‗look what we‘ve done for these 
workers,‘‖ instead of pressing a ULP charge before the NLRB.  ―The proof,‖ he said, 
―is in the pudding.  It worked‖ (Fischl 2006). 
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candlelight vigil of 100 students, faculty and others, 17 students and Father Frank 
Corbishley were holed up in the UM admissions office for 13 hours (Hawking 2006).  
Though Corbishley was exiled to a hallway when Shalala arrived to negotiate, the 
students debated with Shalala for 4 hours before finally agreeing to go home at 1:40 
a.m. in exchange for Shalala‘s promise to attend a meeting with the workers, students 
and union representatives to discuss the situation (Coker-Dukowitz 2006; Hawking 
2006; Hawking 2007).   
The final stage of the campaign‘s escalation consisted of a hunger strike and 
series of fasts, lasting from April 5 until May 1 (Boodhoo 2006d).  This was the 
campaign‘s most pronounced moment of worker agency.  Begun during the period of 
the Christian Lenten fast and reinforced by clergy through the enactment of liturgical 
rites, the hunger strike linked the workers‘ struggle to both a generalized set of social 
conditions prevailing among Miami‘s working poor and a powerful substantive 
tradition of spiritual transcendence.  The idea of the hunger strike originated among 
the workers themselves, a few of whom had been involved in hunger strikes before 
coming to Miami from Cuba (Brakken 2007).  At first perceived by union leaders as 
dangerous and somewhat bizarre, the strategy was initially resisted by SEIU due to the 
significant health risks involved (Corbishley 2006).  Indeed, even as SEIU began to 
facilitate the hunger strike by stationing a nurse at the workers‘ encampment outside 
the UM campus to monitor their health (Hawking 2006), workers took the lead in 
staging the affair, reminding the organizers, ―You don‘t know how to do a hunger 
strike‖ (Brakken 2007).  Beginning among 8 workers, 6 students and the son of one of 
the participating workers (BNA 2006e), the hunger strike was an extreme tactic that 
nonetheless became a decisive way for the campaign to induce a sense of crisis at UM 
that would push management toward settlement (Brakken 2007).  As the hunger 
strike‘s leading participants slowly ceased their fasts due to hospitalization, organizers 
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orchestrated a ―transfer of the fast‖ beginning on April 21, when SEIU President Andy 
Stern and Executive Vice President Eliseo Medina visited Miami to join the workers‘ 
movement (BNA 2006d).  As individual hunger strikers, including workers, clergy, 
faculty, students and others now volunteered to fast for specific shifts of time, Stern 
joined the hunger strike for 72 hours, and Medina undertook an indefinite fast, 
culminating in a trip to the hospital (Ehrenreich 2006).  
Overlapping with the period of the hunger strike was a final wave of publicity 
and celebrity visitations.  On April 12, Charles Steele, Jr., President and CEO of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, came to campus, where he joined student 
demonstrators who refused to leave a spot they were occupying outside the Ashe 
Administrative Building (Rabin 2006).  On April 25, John Edwards, James Hoffa, Jr., 
and journalist Barbara Ehrenreich made appearances at the janitors‘ tent encampment 
under the metro line just off the UM campus, a highly visible symbol and staging 
ground for the campaign that had come to be known as ―Freedom City‖ (Reinhard 
2006). Ehrenreich, reporting on her visit, remarked in her blog that the workers 
encamped at Freedom City appeared engaged in ―democracy in action,‖ debating one 
another actively and planning their next strategic actions (Ehrenreich 2006). 
Under a building sense of public crisis and the prospect that the campaign 
might disrupt UM‘s spring commencement ceremonies, at which former Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright was scheduled to speak, Shalala began to give in (Amernick 
2006; Fischl 2006; Ocampo 2006).  UNICCO agreed to a card-check vote with 60 
percent majority on May 1 (BNA 2006c), and SEIU obtained more than a 70 percent 
majority in its favor in the subsequent card check election, held in Father Frank 
Corbishley‘s ―strike sanctuary‖ (Boodhoo 2006a).  On June 15, the American 
Arbitration Association certified the election, setting the stage for first contract 
negotiations (Boodhoo 2006a). 
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  Buoyed by the momentum of its successful organizing campaign and UM‘s 
time pressure to resolve the labor dispute before the beginning of the following 
academic year, the union was positioned well to obtain favorable new terms for the 
workers; however, Shalala‘s mid-campaign pay raise diminished what could be 
achieved in the first contract.  SEIU local 11‘s first contract ultimately enshrined and 
moderately increased Shalala‘s mid-campaign wage increase, in addition to providing 
health benefits and a more generous holiday plan.  Ratified by the workers at 
Corbishley‘s ―strike sanctuary‖ on August 23 (Boodhoo 2006h), and running from 
September 1, 2006 through August 31, 2010, the contract retained minimum pay for 
housekeepers—80 percent of the approximately 400 employees—at $8.55 an hour; 
minimum pay for landscapers at $9.30 an hour; and minimum pay for food service 
workers at $8 an hour (Boodhoo 2006f; Boodhoo 2006h).  The contract also increased 
hourly wages in each year of the agreement: $0.25 the first year; $0.40 the second 
year; $0.50 the third and fourth years (BNA 2006b).  In addition to the wage increases, 
the contract introduced a low cost health care plan, to which the employer will pay 
more than $250 per month per employee, with worker contributions of only $13 per 
month (Boodhoo 2006b).  Finally, the first contract provided at least one week of paid 
vacation, three paid personal days, and the three additional paid holidays of Christmas 
Eve, New Year‘s Eve and the day after Thanksgiving each year (Boodhoo 2006h). 
 In the wake of the workers‘ victory at UM, the fruits of SEIU‘s countywide 
organizing approach began to fall.  Just a day after the ratification of the first contract 
at UM, Florida International University (FIU) announced that it would attempt to 
provide healthcare coverage to its adjunct faculty, temporary workers and the contract 
employees whom SEIU was then in the process of organizing (Boodhoo 2006b).  FIU, 
which is a state institution, ultimately brought its 133 janitorial workers back in-house 
as state employees, agreed to their representation by AFSCME, and announced pay 
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increases of nearly 50 percent as well as new healthcare access (Boodhoo 2006c).  
FIU‘s decision was widely believed to be an attempt to avoid a costly and potentially 
damaging battle with SEIU in light of the recent events at UM (Boodhoo 2006c).  
Commenting to The Miami Herald on the developments at FIU, Bob Bruno of the 
University of Illinois observed, ―You‘ve now had another increase in labor market 
representation of union janitors.  SEIU knows very well that as the percentage goes 
up, eventually you have a high enough threshold so that it will really start lifting 
wages and benefits for everyone‖ (Boodhoo 2006c).  On October 4, 2006, the more 
than 300 janitorial workers at Nova Southeastern University voted to form a union 
with SEIU; however, the status of the Nova janitors remains uncertain because the 
university decided to rebid its facilities management contract in response to the 
successful organizing drive (Asher 2006c).  At Nova, a commuter school whose only 
tenured faculty are law professors, faculty and student mobilization is comparatively 
blocked (Smiley 2006).  Finally, SEIU recently undertook a campaign to secure union 
representation for janitors, landscapers and food service employees working on the 
wealthy enclave of Fisher Island, south of Miami Beach (Brakken 2007; Porter 2007).  
Part of an emerging pattern of service-sector organizing in and around Miami, such an 
ambitious drive would have been unthinkable in South Florida in the absence of the 
organizational capacity building and successful experimentation that the UM 
campaign pioneered. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
In my final chapter, I will return to a more detailed discussion of the 
contribution that my analysis of the campaign may bring to bear on relevant 
theoretical approaches, but I should say a few words at the outset about which such 
approaches I will be engaging in particular.  To put it rather briefly, I will be applying 
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a Braudelian approach to structuration supplemented by a Gramscian approach to 
historical agency and a Heideggerian approach to language.  This is an ambitious 
theoretical combination but one well-suited to an understanding of how new historical 
blocs might form within the structural conditions of an existing social order and yet 
exhibit symbolic formations not fully determinable in advance by the extant relations 
of production. 
 As earlier discussion has suggested, I structure my argument around Braudel‘s 
conception of historical economic relations as characterized by three strata:  material 
civilization, the market economy, and the ―anti-market‖ domain of privileged 
capitalist actors (1981: 23-24).  Duly wary of any merely mechanical application of 
this tripartite scheme, I use Braudel‘s layers to demarcate rough levels of interaction 
and bases for the specific dialectical confrontation that emerges. 
 My appeal to Gramsci is for a dialectical materialist logic of contestation that 
can come to terms with the relative inertia implicit in the Braudelian model and get at 
a better understanding of the role of various forms of agency in the process Braudel 
calls ―destructuration‖ (1984: 85).  With the Gramscian conceptions of the ―historical 
bloc‖ and (contested) hegemony (1971: 365-66), it becomes possible to imagine not 
only in what sense different historical eras overlap in their periods of emergence and 
decline but also in what manner new sets of historical relations are actively built 
within structures they may later supersede. 
 Finally, I turn to Heidegger for an understanding of the status of emergent 
symbolic structures vis-à-vis these new phenomena.  Heidegger helps here because he 
advances an historicizing conception of truth as the unconcealment of Being (1977: 
173-74) and a non-reductional understanding of the activity of thought as the 
―bringing to language‖ of ―the unspoken word of Being‖ (1977: 239).  This approach 
is more helpful than a conception of the relation of truth as mere correspondence or 
21 
propositional correctness because it reminds us that the mutual conditioning between 
the emergence of phenomena and the symbolic formations they come to inhabit opens 
the production of knowledge to the complementary possibilities of continuous 
revelation and open symbolic play.  As Heidegger puts it, ―[e]very sort of thought… is 
always only the execution and consequence of a mode of historical Dasein, of the 
fundamental position taken toward Being and toward the way in which beings are 
manifest as such, i.e., toward truth‖ (1977: 271).  Novel symbolic formations and 
relationships emerge continuously, and they are not simply distortions, fetishisms or 
the residues of aberrant historical consciousnesses, as some Marxists might have it; 
they are phenomena of the first order and telling, in their own terms, about the 
relations within which humanity faces—and understands—the proposition of its own 
historical existence. 
 My choice of theoretical resources is thus a choice to give both historical 
structural relations and language their due, to analyze what, following Aristotle‘s 
outline in the Metaphysics, we might provisionally understand as the ‗material causes‘ 
of historical productive relations and to connect this analysis with an understanding of 
the ‗formal causes‘ (Aristotle 1958: 113-16) involved in the production and relative 
autonomy of emergent discursive formations.  Marxian literature helps mightily in the 
former analysis, the Heideggerian perspective in the latter.  As a practical political 
construct, the campaign is thus understood to unfold on a horizon bounded by 
‗determinism,‘ on one hand, and ‗free will‘ on another; between the closure implied by 
the totality of historically embedded structural relations and the dis-closure made 
possible through the mobilization of signification. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CAPITAL STRATEGY AND THE ‗ELITE‘ PERSPECTIVE 
Overview 
The University of Miami Justice for Janitors campaign, far from an act of pure 
spontaneity, was conditioned by strategies pursued by local and national financial and 
political elites to shape and govern the city as a major outpost of U.S. banking, trade 
and territorial hegemony in the Caribbean Basin, Central America and South America.  
The elite actors in question—representing both capital and labor interests—pursued 
various and often conflicting aims but shared a common concern with the growth of 
the capacity of this increasingly ―global city‖ to produce the ―top-level management 
and coordination functions and the specialized services needed to run spatially 
dispersed economic operations‖ (Sassen and Portes 1993: 471) based in the Caribbean 
region but involved in worldwide relations of exchange.  Operating above both 
‗material life‘ and the ‗market economy,‘ these actors occupied what Braudel 
described as ―the zone of the anti-market, where the great predators roam and the law 
of the jungle operates‖ (1982: 230).  Here, of course, it is useful to keep in mind that 
predation can imply only a relative kind of autonomy. 
Elite actors aimed to create in Miami a highly rationalized space from which 
command functions associated with the financial expansion of U.S. capital on an 
increasingly global basis could be exercised regionally.  As Braudel explains it, ―[a]t 
this level one enters a shadowy zone, a twilight area of activities by the initiated which 
I believe to lie at the very root of what is encompassed by the term capitalism: the 
latter being an accumulation of power (one that bases exchange on the balance of 
strength, as much as, or more than on the reciprocity of needs)‖ (1981: 22).  Elite 
interest in Miami was, thus, directed toward procuring a ―clean space‖ for financial 
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and other governance operations: toward securing an opening to shelter its local 
operatives and to advance the influence of its particular calculative and speculative 
activities, not exclusively locally but over a widely dispersed domain of potential 
economic and territorial influence. 
As we will explore in greater detail in Chapter 3, however, elite demand for 
new, clean administrative and housing space in the greater Miami-Dade region led to 
the growth and increasing concentration of a heavily exploited urban service class, 
largely drawn from first-generation immigrant populations.  Exploitation and 
dispossession of these workers went hand-in-hand with the expansion of neoliberal 
market relations on a broader and deeper basis.  The growth of a new international 
corporate sector in Miami was accompanied by a decline in Miami‘s limited 
manufacturing sector and of local relations within the city‘s older business sector, 
including interests controlled by some of the city‘s Cuban-American bourgeoisie.  
Poorer residents and newly arrived immigrants to the city were increasingly called 
upon to offer their services in cleaning and maintaining newly built international 
office, hotel and condominium spaces just as they themselves were being pushed by 
the new construction and renovation projects toward habitation in distant exurbs, 
urban slums and squatter settlements. 
This chapter will detail the role of elite actors in conditioning and otherwise 
preparing the way for the campaign.  After describing Miami‘s history as an 
increasingly global city immersed in the hegemonic dynamics of trade, finance, 
governance and defense, I will attempt to explain the relative neutrality of the Cuban-
American expatriate bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the campaign, elaborate the opportunities 
attracting major U.S. labor organizing investment to Miami, and explain the failure of 
a public servant and former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services in defending a neo-liberal wage regime there. 
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The Prehistory
18
 
The place that is now Miami has been part of the United States‘ territorial logic 
in the Caribbean basin and Latin America only since the middle of the 19
th
 century.  
Prior to the U.S. capture of Florida from Spain in 1819 following a protracted proxy 
battle with the Seminole which would erupt again in 1835 and not be concluded until 
the categorical defeat and exile of the latter by 1842, South Florida had been a part of 
the Spanish Empire in the Americas.  For Imperial Spain, South Florida was ―an 
important military outpost; it was used as part of the strategy to defend the Spanish 
fleets that carried gold and silver from Mexico to Europe‖ (Grosfoguel 1995: 158).  
The remains of the walled city and fortification at St Augustine, about 300 miles north 
of Miami, provides enduring testimony to Spain‘s territorial establishment along the 
Florida coast as early as the beginning of the 16
th
 century (Id.).  By the middle of the 
19
th
 century, when South Florida came under formal U.S. control, the region was 
―largely an unpopulated territory with several military outposts, including Fort 
Meyers, Fort Lauderdale, and Fort Dallas (now Miami),‖ with an interior in which a 
few Native American groups that had survived the Second Seminole War, as 
prosecuted from Fort Dallas, still dwelt (Id.).   
The territorial significance of Fort Dallas/Miami persisted well after the formal 
foundation of the City of Miami in 1896, by which time the place could be reached by 
Henry Flagler‘s rail, drained of residual swamp water, and opened up as ―a tourist 
resort for wealthy families from the north-east‖ (Grosfoguel 1995: 159).  ―Camp 
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 I begin with „prehistory‟ to situate the campaign in the overall world-
historical dynamic that made it possible for anything like a Justice for Janitors 
campaign to arise at anything like the University of Miami at all.  The discussion that 
follows is, in many ways, a vast „zoom‟ into the relations that will concern us most in 
the paper.  As a „setting of the stage,‟ its significance is less specifically analytic than 
environing and contextualizing.  
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Miami‖ would provide a base for U.S. operations during the Spanish-American war in 
1898 (Id.), and military operations based in Miami would be involved in several 
subsequent invasions or occupations of Caribbean states until the advent of Franklin 
Roosevelt‘s ―Good Neighbor Policy‖ in 1933, renouncing U.S. aspirations to the 
direct military domination of Latin America (Keylor 2003).  With specific interest for 
our purposes, the U.S. would occupy Cuba from 1898 through 1902 and from 1906 
through 1909, with subsequent invasions in 1912 and 1917; Nicaragua from 1912 
through 1924 and from 1927 through 1933; and Honduras from 1912 through 1919 
and 1924 through 1925 (Keylor 2003: 270).  Miami would also play a role in the 
Army air and Naval defense of the U.S. during World War II, with the Army Air 
Corps basing itself in (the tourist hotels of) Miami Beach beginning in 1942 and the 
Navy using the port as a base of surveillance for German U-boats in the Caribbean 
(Grosfoguel 1995: 159). 
With the conclusion of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, 
Miami ―continued to play a central role in the operations of intelligence agencies in 
the Southern Hemisphere‖ (Grosfoguel 1995: 159).  Following the Cuban Revolution 
in 1959, the counter-revolutionary activities of Cuban-American exiles who had fled 
to Miami and the intelligence activities of the United States vis-à-vis the southern 
portion of the Western Hemisphere began to converge there.  During the early 1960s, 
as Grosfoguel points out, the University of Miami housed ―the largest CIA station in 
the world,‖ second only to the headquarters in Langley (Id. 159).  During this period, 
through an alliance established between the CIA, the displaced Cuban Mafia, and 
other Cuban expatriates, numerous Cuban-owned businesses came to serve as fronts 
for CIA operations in the region; the result was a Federal subsidy of millions of dollars 
to Cuban-American business owners, the city‘s debut as ―the undisputed ‗drug capital‘ 
of the world,‖ and the consolidation of this strategic outpost as ―the centre for the 
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control and co-ordination of CIA operations in Central America and the Caribbean 
during the 1970s and 1980s‖ (Id. 159).  In the early 1960s, the CIA was one of the 
largest employers in the State of Florida, with around 12,000 Cuban-Americans 
employed in Miami (Id.).  Altogether, by Grosfoguel‘s estimate, the CIA‘s Cold War-
era expenditures among Miami‘s Cuban-American community totaled $250 million 
(Id. 161). 
The United States‘ strategic investment in territorialist activities based in 
Miami continued through the major portion of the 1980s.  Much as CIA investment in 
the Cuban-American community had impacted local economic and social relations in 
the city during the prior two decades, the United States‘ interventions in the 
Nicaraguan Contra war and the civil war in El Salvador ―pumped Miami with millions 
of dollars once again‖ (Grosfoguel 1995: 159), this time to the advantage of a smaller 
cohort of certain militant expatriates of the socialist Sandinista regime that had come 
to power in Nicaragua in 1979.  The Nicaraguan ―Contras,‖ the U.S.-supported 
resistance to the Sandinista regime, ―not only received millions of dollars a year from 
the U.S. government but also raised a fortune through drug smuggling, which was 
laundered through a dozen or so companies in Miami‖ (Id. 159), with little more than 
a wink from the United States at the time.  Much like the broader cohort of Cuban-
Americans who had benefited from Federal spending during the 60s and 70s, a 
handful of Nicaraguan expatriates enjoyed Federal subsidies and favoritism within a 
loosely governed system of corrupt relations conducive to intelligence gathering, the 
strengthening of regional hegemony, and drug trafficking.  To get at some measure of 
the magnitude of the latter by this point, Grosfoguel reports a Federal estimate from 
the early 1980s that ―around 28 billion dollars‘ worth of illegal drugs‖ entered the 
United States through Miami every year (Id. 159).  ―Violence in Miami,‖ observes 
Ann Louise Bardach, ―reached peak levels during the Reagan-Bush years, 1981-1989, 
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when the Contra war in Nicaragua was being waged,‖ leading the FBI to denominate 
Miami the ―murder capital of America‖ in 1985, due in rather equal measure to drug 
trafficking and exile violence (2002: 116). 
In addition to serving the military and intelligence interests of the United 
States during the Cold War, the special status accorded to expatriate groups in Miami 
such as the Cubans and Nicaraguans provided the U.S. with symbolic and discursive 
power in its protracted struggle with the Soviet Union.  Grosfoguel describes this 
move as the production of a kind of ―symbolic capital‖ that can be ―exercised vis-à-vis 
the development model of another core state or of a challenging peripheral state, for 
example, by the ‗showcasing‘ or presentation of a city or an ethnic group within a city 
as ‗successful stories‘ to ideologically ‗conquer the minds‘ of other people within a 
peripheral region‖ (1995: 157).  As Grosfoguel elaborates, following the Cuban 
revolution, the U.S. sought ―a ‗successful capitalist model‘ to gain symbolic capital 
vis-à-vis the Soviet model exemplified by Cuba‖ (1995: 160).  The tens of thousands 
of Cuban political and economic elites who fled to Miami from revolutionary Cuba, as 
―refugees escaping communism,‖ became powerful ideological symbols in the play of 
the Cold War (Id. 160).  ―In order to have an effect on the Cubans that remained on 
the island as well as on the entire Caribbean region,‖ observes Grosfoguel, ―the US 
state developed specific policies to make [the Cuban-Americans] a ‗success story,‘‖ 
including the creation of a Cuban refugee program ―to facilitate the successful 
incorporation of the Cuban elites into the receiving society‖ (Id. 160).  Altogether 
during the 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. invested approximately $1 billion directly 
in education, bilingual programs, food and health care subsidies and employment 
programs targeting a population of less than 600,000 Cuban-Americans residing in the 
Miami metropolitan region at the time (Id.).  In addition, Cuban-American businesses 
in Miami received about 46.9 percent of all loans issued by the Small Business 
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Administration (SBA) in Miami from 1968 through 1979, totaling $47.6 million (Id. 
160-61).  In play as signifiers of the promise of U.S.-led capitalism in Latin America 
since the early 1960s, the symbolic status of groups such as the Cubans and 
Nicaraguans would thus arise in 2006 in the obverse, in evidence that the assumed 
‗symbolic capital‘ of the ‗success story‘ was, indeed, a two-sided coin. 
The territorialist and symbolic logics informing Miami‘s historical 
development throughout the 20
th
 century are thus indispensible to an explanation of its 
emergence as a ‗global city‘ with significant economic power by the early 21st.  As 
Grosfoguel summarizes the dynamic, ―[i]t is the US core state‘s symbolic and military 
strategies during the first Cold War challenge of US domination in the Caribbean that 
provides the historical background for the emergence of Miami as a world city in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s‖  (Id. 161).  This is so because ―strategic cities provide 
better political, social and infrastructural conditions for the control and management of 
global capital‖ (Id. 161).  In the words of Braudel, ―[t]he great cities created, let us 
repeat, the modern state, as much as they were created by it.  National markets 
expanded under their impetus as did the nations themselves and they lay at the heart of 
capitalism and modern civilization…  For the historian they are primarily an excellent 
yardstick of development in Europe and the other continents.  Interpreted properly, 
their study leads to a general and unusually comprehensive view of the whole history 
of material life‖ (1981: 556).  A striking example in the case of Miami is the use, after 
1975, of infrastructure built to serve the military and intelligence interests of the 
United States to advance the profit-making objectives of individual corporations and 
banks relocating to the area.  The CIA invested millions of dollars in Miami after 1959 
in the state-making objective of ―improving infrastructural communications and the 
social networks of Miami with the Caribbean Basin‖ (Grosfoguel 1995: 167), but 
beyond the immediate interest in promoting U.S. territorial hegemony during the Cold 
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War standoff with soviet Cuba, this State spending had the ultimate effect of opening 
and facilitating a new regional market for U.S. capital in the Caribbean.  ―The 
transnational headquarters and international banking that proliferated in Miami after 
1975 took advantage of these facilities for their own operations,‖ in a sense 
appropriating ―a whole infrastructure built originally for purposes different to those for 
which they are currently used‖ (Id. 167). 
 
The (Profuse) Global City 
There is a growing consensus in academic literature that Miami has acceded to 
the status of a ‗global city‘ with highly concentrated financial, managerial, trade, 
service and media sectors (Sassen and Portes 1993; Grosfoguel 1995; Nissen and 
Russo 2007).  Sassen and Portes explain that ―Miami now has the fourth largest 
concentration of foreign bank offices in the United States, right behind New York, Los 
Angeles, and Chicago‖ (1993: 471).  Nissen and Russo observe that Miami is known 
as the ―gateway to Latin America,‖ whose ―banking investment and trade ties with 
Latin America and the Caribbean are the strongest of any U.S. city‖ (2007: 147).  
Grosfoguel, for his part, notes that Miami‘s trade with Latin America and the 
Caribbean ―is of such a magnitude that in 1992 the US Custom Service moved the 
Andean/Caribbean help desk from Washington DC to Miami‖ (1995: 163-64).  By 
1982, the Port of Miami enjoyed the largest Caribbean and Latin American market 
share among all ports in the U.S., far outstripping the Port of New Orleans, which had 
historically dominated U.S. trade in the Caribbean Basin (Id.).  As Sassen and Portes 
endeavor to explain this massive phenomenal pattern, ―[t]he development of global 
city functions in Miami seems to derive from the recent sharp growth in the absolute 
levels of international investment in Latin America, the growing complexity of the 
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transactions involved, and the trend for firms all over the world to operate globally‖ 
(1993: 476). 
  And yet, more is at play historically and contextually in the rise of Miami‘s 
prominence than a merely synchronic tendency toward the concentration of capital.  
World-historical consideration of the phenomenon over a longer temporal horizon 
would tend to suggest that diachronic processes also part of the picture.  To get at the 
world-historical meaning of Miami‘s apparently meteoric rise to ‗global city‘ status 
after the early 1970s, some reflection on the conjuncture thus seems appropriate.  It is 
necessary to situate the concept of the ‗global city‘ in a frame of reference that 
considers the larger processes of world-systemic structuration and destructuration of 
which it is a part.  Sassen posited the growth in demand for the ‗functions‘ performed 
by ‗global cities‘—as concentration points for economic command activities, finance 
and specialized services, innovative production, and consumption activities—to flow 
from generalized processes of ―spatial dispersal and global integration‖ ongoing at the 
beginning of the century (2001: 3).  Such processes, however, were part of a 
specific—and limited—historical dynamic, not a generalized tendency toward regional 
aggregation.  In the ‗ground rules‘ for his typology of world economies, Braudel 
observed that ―[t]here is no such thing as a world-economy without its own area.‖  On 
the contrary, a world-economy is spatially limited and ―invariably has a centre, with a 
city and an already-dominant type of capitalism, whatever form this takes.‖  ―A 
profusion of such centres,‖ Braudel went on to say, ―represents either immaturity or on 
the contrary some kind of decline or mutation.  In the face of pressures both internal 
and external, there may be shifts of the centre of gravity: cities with international 
destinies—world cities—are in perpetual rivalry with one another and may take each 
other‘s place‖ (1984: 25-26). 
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Braudel‘s observation that a profusion of world city centers signals systemic 
immaturity and/or decline may be useful in understanding how Miami‘s rise to 
regional predominance relates to the financial expansion of U.S.-based capitalism 
from 1973 through 2008 (cf. Arrighi 1994) and the current moment of significant 
word-historical indeterminacy.  As Grosfoguel suggests, the emergence and 
unprecedented growth, after 1973, of new global cities such as Miami can be 
explained as a consequence of the global capitalist restructuring necessitated by the 
(signal) crisis of profitability of the post-war regime of accumulation led by the United 
States (Grosfoguel 1995; Arrighi 1994).  From this perspective, the oil crisis of 1973, 
the end of the gold standard, the massive inflation of the early 1970s and the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreements were part of a larger crisis of 
profitability in the core economies of the postwar West.  Surplus capital in search of 
sustained profitable investment opportunities began to exit these core economies, in 
which marginal revenue product was declining, to avail itself of the lower factor costs 
available in peripheral and semi-peripheral regions (Grosfoguel 1995).  Likewise, 
financial institutions in more peripheral and regional areas began to experience higher 
rates of return on assets than banks in major urban centers (Id.).  In a strategic move to 
cope with these conditions, both transnational producers and international banks began 
pursuing a kind of decentralization, ―paying more attention to regional and peripheral 
processes,‖ and opening ―regional headquarters in strategic cities around the world‖ 
(Id. 162).  As increasingly internationally mobile finance capital intensified its 
investments in more profitable regions such as the Caribbean Basin and Central 
America, where labor and raw material costs were relatively low, there arose 
commensurate surveillance needs for ―closer and more direct supervision‖ over such 
new investments in productive capital (Id. 162). 
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Thus, in and through its own financial expansion, the post-war U.S. regime of 
accumulation—indisputably centered in New York— began a process of regional 
devolution or diffusion (cf. Allen and Brickman 1977; 1979).  ―New York, where 
many multinational global headquarters concentrate, became a weaker location for 
close management of Caribbean investments‖ than regional cities such as Miami and 
San Juan (Grosfoguel 1995: 162).  As Grosfoguel explains, ―[t]he transformations in 
Miami form part of a single process of capital restructuring in the entire Caribbean 
city system that transformed the regional division of labour.‖  By this account of the 
center-periphery dynamics of the long twentieth century, ―[b]efore 1973, most of the 
Caribbean islands were agrarian or mining enclaves exporting primary products to the 
core economies‖ (Id. 162).  Following the capitalist restructuring after 1973, the shift 
in the international division of labor precipitated a state of affairs in which ―Caribbean 
countries are now exporters of manufactured consumer goods‖ (Id. 162).  Miami is 
―an example of a recently formed world city‖ constituted to cope with these changing 
conditions of international political economy on a regional basis.  Now arguably 
worthy of the title ‗capital of the Caribbean,‘ Miami effectively exercises ―functions of 
control and management of global capital for the entire Caribbean Basin‖ (Id. 162).  
Concrete evidence of such control and management might be observed in the 
institutional formation of the Miami Free Trade Zone (FTZ), physically located near 
the Miami International Airport (Id.).  Now the largest FTZ in the United States, the 
Miami FTZ hosts several hundred export/import companies that enjoy custom tariff 
exemptions from their storage, manufacture, assembly or re-export of goods from 
abroad (Id.).  As Grosfoguel explains, the FTZ ―has provided international banking 
and transnational headquarters with an attractive institutional environment for trade 
and capital investment in the Caribbean Basin‖ (Id. 167). 
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The consequences of the ‗global city‘ phenomenon in Miami of greatest 
interest for our purposes are the increasing demand for office space in the metropolitan 
area since the 1980s and a related growing ―geography of inequality‖ (Sassen and 
Portes 1993: 475) impacting the region and its people.  As Sassen and Portes explain, 
the sectors key to the emergence of Miami as a ‗global city‘ were producer service 
industries (including banking, business services, engineering, accounting and legal 
services), on one hand, and the industrial and transportation services provided by 
Miami‘s busy ports and airports, on another (1993: 474-75).  Growth in (demand for 
space by) the producer and transportation service sectors throughout the 1980s meant 
that, by the end of the decade, Markettrends could report that ―Miami was in the top 
fifteen U.S. metropolitan areas in the supply of prime rental office space,‖ with a 
breathtaking 44 million square feet of such space (Sassen and Portes 1993: 475).  Not 
necessarily confined to the old business district of the City of Miami, growth of 
‗global city‘ functions in greater Miami was ―physically embodied in a new financial 
district (south of the old central business district) housing the international offices of a 
number of U.S. and foreign banks and in the Latin American headquarters of many 
national and foreign corporations that are in Coral Gables‖ (Id. 475), where the 
campus of the University of Miami is located.  Here, in any case, was an explosion of 
new office space, and a commensurate explosion in demand for its cleaning and 
maintenance. 
The same conditions that facilitated the growth of the new and increasingly 
international corporate sector in Miami also worked to the disadvantage of much of 
the city‘s older business community, led to a weakening of lower-income 
communities, and strengthened existing patterns of inequality in employment (Sassen 
and Portes 1993).  The older business sector in Miami, ―largely dominated by 
commercial banks, savings and loan associations, and certain branches of the real 
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estate and insurance industries‖ experienced a decline during this period, as did 
manufacturing for the domestic market, outstripped by competition from the new 
growth sectors and a new export-oriented manufacturing sector, respectively (Id. 475).  
Meanwhile, ―high-income residential and commercial gentrification‖ precipitated 
decay in lower-income communities as a rise of the cost of living in the metropolitan 
region as a whole was not sufficiently offset by rising wages (Id. 475).  After the 
recession in the U.S. following the terrorist attacks of 2001, this pattern of 
gentrification and mounting inequality proceeded well into the middle of the current 
decade.  In the two-year period between 2004 and 2006, for instance, approaching the 
pinnacle of the fateful U.S. ―housing bubble,‖ the average cost per square foot for new 
condominium space in Miami-Dade County as a whole increased fully 35 percent—
from $100 to $135— while average unit square footage decreased nearly 18 percent—
from 2,529 feet to 2,075 feet (IADC 2007).  In the same period, Miami-Dade County 
saw a rise in median household income of only 11 percent, from $37,025 to $41,237 
per year (U.S. Census Bureau).  In the labor market itself, the significant occupational 
inequality that had long characterized the ―rather clear cut racial and ethnic order‖ of 
the city was only exacerbated by the influx of new national and foreign firms that 
simply reconstituted the city‘s ‗white‘ elite (Sassen and Portes 1993: 476).  Non-
Hispanic whites continue to dominate the leading industries and to populate the top of 
the occupational structure, with Latino/a and African-American workers largely 
constituting Miami‘s unskilled service workforce (Id.). 
 
The Cuban-American Elite 
A decisive strategic and conditioning factor of the campaign was the strength 
and disposition of Miami‘s powerful Cuban-American community, which dominates 
the politics of the city and continues to play a major role in local market relations.  
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Because Cuban-American support—or at least tolerance—for the campaign was a 
decisive precondition for its even limited survival in the political arena of Miami, the 
campaign‘s strategic and tactical repertoires walked a kind of tightrope between the 
predominantly politically conservative Cuban-American community‘s approach to 
economic and discursive articulation in the city and an aspiration toward a vocal 
politics of worker democracy. 
 The Cuban-American community,
19
 massively influential in the rise of Miami 
as a ‗global city‘ and destination for international finance capital in the Caribbean 
Basin, enjoys a leading role in the political and economic life of the city.  ―Cubans,‖ as 
Sassen and Portes explain, ―were Miami‘s comparative advantage in the interurban 
competition for international business‖ (1993: 476) that led to the city‘s rise in 
significance.  As Grosfoguel elaborates, ―what has transformed Miami‖ into a world 
city is ―not just the presence of the Spanish-speaking community,‖ but the specific 
presence, facilitated and assisted by the United States, of ―an economically successful 
Cuban community‖ (1995: 165).  This is because, to overstate the situation only 
slightly, ―the Cuban revolution uprooted and transplanted to Miami an entire national 
bourgeoisie‖ (Id. 165).20  Cuban-American émigrés represented a ―large pool of 
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 By „Cuban-American community,‟ I do not mean to suggest a social 
monolith.  Miami‟s large population of Cuban-Americans is far from homogeneous, 
possessing indefinite boundaries and containing significant elements of difference and 
dissent.  What I am suggesting is that the politically conservative climate known to 
prevail among Miami‟s Cuban-American elite circles was a significant factor 
informing the strategic play of the campaign. 
20
 This is not, of course, to suggest that all Cuban-Americans in Miami today 
are affluent.  Cuban émigrés to Miami since the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 have typically 
been significantly less advantaged financially than those who first fled to the city 
immediately after the revolution in 1959.  The larger socio-cultural point, however, is 
that, above and beyond the relatively wealthy families from Cuba who first fled to 
Miami during the Revolution, Miami has become the home of an émigré population 
that was actively shaped—„negatively‟ by the experience of the Cuban Revolution and 
„positively‟ by the interventions of the United States—as an exile „bourgeoisie.‟ 
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educated and fluent bilingual labor‖ that proved especially attractive to international 
corporations doing business in Latin America (Sassen and Portes 1993: 472).  In 
addition, the Cuban-American migration ―not only relocated some of Cuba‘s 
established networks with the Caribbean and Latin America, but also created new 
ones,‖ specifically among the import/export businesses (the number of which tripled 
in Miami to over 300 between 1970 and 1980), in the sale of consumer goods, and in 
regional banking (Grosfoguel 1995: 165).  Largely converging and remaining in the 
Miami metropolitan area rather than dispersing nationally, moreover, Cuban-
Americans—numbering 767,349 or about 32 percent of the Miami-Dade County 
population in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau)—have used their ―economic power and 
geographical concentration to gain control of local politics,‖ holding a preponderance 
of local mayoralties and state, local and federal representative positions in the region 
as early as the early 1990s (Sassen and Portes 1993).    
Miami‘s Cuban-American bourgeoisie, an established business elite, 
experienced the rise of new forms of international economic activity in Miami as a 
mixed blessing, however.  As Sassen and Portes explain, ―the particular forms of 
economic globalization over the last decade have encouraged growth in Miami that is 
distinct from that in the [Cuban] enclave, though benefiting from it‖ (1993: 476).  
Cubans émigrés who arrived in Miami in the 1960s and 1970s are typically quite well 
off and ―make up the bulk of Hispanic entrepreneurs as well as politicians,‖ but the 
economic shift toward international trade and finance in the city ―brought with it a 
corporate elite of firms that operate on vast, worldwide scale,‖ representing ―a 
concentration of power that no local elite can compete with‖ (Id. 476).  Cuban-
American elites continue to be disadvantaged, moreover, by a residual ethnocentric 
hierarchy in Miami still controlled by an Anglo-Saxon elite.  ―There is clear evidence 
of a ‗glass ceiling‘ for Cubans in the non-Cuban corporate sector‖ in the Miami, a 
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sector whose importance has increased considerably in the past three decades.  Indeed, 
―[t]he influx of new national and foreign firms has reconstituted the ‗white‘ elite and 
thereby probably reinforced the glass ceiling‖ weighing on Cuban-American 
ascendance (Id. 476).  ―The remaining whites‖ in Miami, as Sassen and Portes explain, 
―enjoy the highest average occupational and income levels and continue to vie with 
Cuban-Americans for political control‖ in the city (Id. 476), despite their minority 
status. 
Thus aspiring to (the maintenance of) political hegemony in the city, Miami‘s 
Cuban-American elites have increasingly relied upon the consent of a broad cross-
section of the city‘s population, including poorer recent immigrants from Cuba and 
other Latin American countries whose livelihood in the city was tied to Miami‘s large 
unskilled service sector.  Poorer individuals from Cuba have, of course, been 
emigrating to Miami since before the Cuban revolution in 1959, but in the overall 
historical pattern, it was the fugitive Cuban elite that settled massively in Miami first, 
followed by ‗political refugees‘ of the Castro regime and then by ‗economic refugees‘ 
seeking work and better life conditions in Miami (Bardach 2002).  The most 
significant single such latter migration occurred in 1980 when 125,000 poorer Cuban 
refugees—about 10 percent of whom had been released for the occasion from prisons 
or insane asylums—came ashore in Miami in the course of the Mariel Boat Lift 
(Bardach 2002).  Betweeen the batistianos—partisans of the deposed Fulgencio 
Batista who began arriving in Miami in the beginning of January 1959—and the 
marielitos—refugees from Cuba who made it to Miami on the Mariel Boat Lift in 
1980—was a wide gulf of socioeconomic and life-experiential difference.  More 
encompassing leadership strategies were required to bridge this gulf, and so, by the 
time of the janitors‘ campaign in Miami in the spring of 2006, for instance, Miami-
Dade County‘s politically-conservative Cuban-led government had already passed a 
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―living wage‖ ordinance applying to all employees of the County and its contractors 
(Albright 2008).  Immediately following the success of the janitors‘ campaign at UM, 
moreover, the City of Miami passed its own such ordinance along with a resolution 
supporting the Federal ―Employee Free Choice Act,‖ which would make it easier for 
labor unions to organize workers through card-check recognition campaigns (Brakken 
2007).  Far from reflecting a domineering business elitism, the approach of Miami‘s 
Cuban-American governing elite was tending in a distinctly moderate and hegemonic 
direction. 
Despite the overall ambivalence of Cuban-American elites toward the general 
proposition of union organizing in Miami by 2006, Cuban-American politics certainly 
channeled and constrained the tenor of the campaign.  Thus, for instance, the janitors‘ 
campaign sought out support from the Cuban-American community by orchestrating 
ads on Radio Mambí (Brakken 2007), the number one partisan radio station in Miami 
among Cuban-American exiles and the brainchild of Armando Pérez-Roura, who 
worked for Battista in the 1950s as Cuba‘s official radio announcer and then switched 
sides to work for the Castro regime until 1968, when he fled to Miami and switched 
sides again (Bardach 2002).  The campaign used its Radio Mambí spots ostensibly to 
request the support of Republican political candidates for local office (Brakken 2007).  
The campaign also studiously avoided the impropriety of appearing ―Democratic,‖ in 
the sense of the Democratic Party of the United States.  Cuban-American relations 
with the latter have been strained roughly since the Kennedy Administration‘s refusal 
of air support in the Cuban exile community‘s botched Bay of Pigs invasion that 
sought to overthrow the Castro regime in 1961 (Bardach 2002).  Even today, among 
the roughly 800,000 Cuban-Americans living in Miami, about 85 percent are 
registered Republicans, with only about 5 percent registered as Democrats (Id. 308).  
It is in this partisan context alone that it is possible to understand how meaning 
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emerged in the political discourse of the campaign.  As Feliciano Hernandez, a Cuban-
American maintenance worker, veteran organizer and now union ‗shop steward,‘ 
cleverly explained the content of the struggle he had pursued and still led: ―No es 
Democrata.  Es Democracia [It‘s not Democratic.  It‘s Democracy]‖ (Hernandez 
2007).  ‗Democratic‘ was not merely a less exalted state than ‗Democracy‘ itself; it 
was also still a very inconvenient thing to be in Miami in the middle of the first decade 
of the 21
st
 century. 
 
The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
A second set of elite interests involved in intentionally structuring, sustaining 
and setting the campaign in motion was represented by the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU), which presently claims 2 million members throughout the 
United States, working in the property services, public service and healthcare sectors.  
While the treatment of a U.S. labor union as an ‗elite‘ actor may seem paradoxical or 
even ideologically right-wing to some seminarians and partisans, it does reflect a 
reasonable assessment of the levels of organizing investment and intelligent 
manipulation of which SEIU had necessarily become capable by the time of the 
Justice for Janitors campaign at the University of Miami.  Attention to the union qua 
elite actor, moreover, helps us—dialectically—distinguish the labor union from the 
community of workers it successfully organized and the union‘s strategic planning 
from the real unfolding of the campaign.  Explicitly registering the elite nature of the 
union‘s influence, in other words, enables a more complete understanding of the logic 
of its ―vanguard‖ role.  As we shall see, SEIU‘s coordinated campaign relied upon 
high levels of geographic, market and social intelligence to produce well-planned 
strategic campaign effects. 
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The University of Miami Justice for Janitors campaign fit into SEIU‘s overall 
geographic and market strategy of rebuilding the ranks of the waning U.S. labor 
movement by organizing workers outside the traditional core of U.S. industrial 
capitalism in the growing regional cities of the U.S. South and Southwest.  Building 
upon its first massive victories organizing Latino/a janitors in Los Angeles beginning 
in the 1990s (Milkman 2006) and its success in 2005 in organizing thousands of 
janitors cleaning new office space in Houston, SEIU redoubled its efforts to organize 
workers in such southern and southwestern cities as Miami and San Antonio 
(Cunningham 2006).  In this sense, SEIU‘s overall strategic logic was not distinctly 
different from that which gave rise to the movement of labor and capital to these 
emergent cities in the first instance (as narrated in the discussion of Miami‘s rise as a 
‗global city‘ location, supra).  As SEIU organizer Erik Brakken explained the basis of 
SEIU‘s interest in Miami: ―[SEIU President] Andy Stern has been talking about South 
Florida for some time…  Miami is an international city and a major player in the FIRE 
[finance, insurance and real estate] sector, connecting the U.S. and Latin America‖ 
(Brakken 2007).  SEIU was ‗following the money,‘ pursuing opportunities for 
expansion by actively leveraging resources amassed from prior productive 
engagement.  The dues—and even pension funds—of established local unions in the 
Northeast and upper Midwest that had fairly saturated or exhausted their own regional 
markets
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 were being invested and deployed strategically in campaigns, coordinated 
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 One of these established locals that contributed a great deal to the Miami 
campaign was SEIU Local 32BJ, which is based in southern Manhattan and represents 
more than 100,000 janitors, mainly in and about the New York metropolitan area.  As 
Reverend C.J. Hawking, of the Interfaith Worker Justice organization that collaborates 
closely with SEIU, explained, ―Local 32BJ was the parent financing the campaign.  I 
was really taken with the fact that a union in New York, rather than sitting on its 
treasury, sends workers out to organize workers in another city.  It‘s very powerful 
when this happens…  32BJ provided a lot of really incredible people.  This is one of 
the brightest groups of people I‘ve ever worked with‖ (Hawking 2007). 
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by the international union in Washington (Savage 2006), toward the aggressive pursuit 
of attractive new organizing targets in the emerging urban regions.  To orchestrate 
such broad strategic maneuvers, SEIU relied upon detailed market intelligence 
provided by a large staff of professional in-house researchers (Albright 2008), who 
provided geographically-specific data describing, on one hand, the broad urban 
markets for office space, and on another, the specific relationships between building 
owners, managers and maintenance vendors that might be exploited in campaigns 
aiming for market capture. 
The campaign, moreover, was guided by a well-informed social organizing 
logic.  SEIU‘s huge deployment of research and bargaining staff led to the realization 
of what its press releases announced as a ―growing coalition of community leaders‖ 
supporting its organizing efforts at UM (Asher 2006b).  It has been remarked that the 
Justice for Janitors campaign model, beginning with its earliest successes in Los 
Angeles in the early 1990s, ―exposes the importance of unions building coalitions—
with politicians, religious and community organizations, and with other unions—as 
well as the value of careful analysis of legal, industrial and political conditions on the 
part of union organizers‖ (Erickson et al. 2002: 544).  The janitors‘ campaign at UM 
was, indeed attuned to the importance of ―appealing to the wider public for support‖ 
(Id. 544), from building up powerful student and faculty allies to mobilizing the 
support of local clergy and cultivating public opinion through media spots.  As 
Stephen Lerner, director of SEIU‘s building services division and the innovator of the 
Justice for Janitors model, described the organizing approach when SEIU began its 
work in south Florida among condo workers in February 2005: ―We are building on 
our experience that there are multiple things that you have to do simultaneously to 
win‖ (BNA 2005).  This was an organizing logic with a specific aim of political 
power-building. 
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Thus, SEIU invested enormous resources in the Miami campaign‘s 
mobilization effort, which was centrally coordinated from SEIU international 
headquarters on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington, with information provided by 
researchers and organizers on the ground in Miami (Amernick 2006).
22
  This was an 
extraordinarily sophisticated and well-funded operation.  In all, SEIU Local 11, which 
had no membership until the fall of 2006, spent more than $5.85 million in subsidies 
and strike funds provided by the international union during 2005 and 2006 (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2005, 2006).  As Richard Ocampo (2006), a colleague who was 
an organizer for Local 11 throughout the campaign, recalls, ―Half of the ‗local‘ staff 
when I was there was from the international.‖  This was a peculiar, albeit highly 
instrumental, way to pursue a ―grassroots‖ organizing campaign (Cf. Savage 2006).  In 
addition to representing part of SEIU‘s larger strategy of organizing in the South and 
Southwest, moreover, the campaign in Miami also conveniently overlapped with a 
period of national agreement negotiations with UM‘s cleaning contractor UNICCO, 
which provides cleaning services throughout the U.S.  As the campaign at UM became 
more intense, it ultimately offered SEIU a significant lever in these national 
negotiations with the corporation (Amernick 2006). 
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 During the height of the campaign in March and April of 2006, I overheard a 
variety of conversations about the University of Miami janitors‘ campaign while 
working as a researcher for SEIU local 1199—a large healthcare workers‘ local union 
based on the west side of Manhattan—on the research floor of SEIU International 
Headquarters in Washington, where my office was housed.  None of my work 
involved the janitors‘ campaign at UM or even janitors, but ignoring news from the 
campaign would have been impossible.  Significant portions of the international 
research staff, an entire large office floor of young analysts, were conducting research 
and sharing ―real-time‖ information—as they were fond of thinking about it—
concerning the progress of the campaign.  On a number of occasions I overheard the 
name of my former law professor Michael Fischl, in addition to the names of Feliciano 
and Clara, two of the striking janitors I would later come to recognize as key leaders 
of the workers‘ struggle. 
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University of Miami President Donna Shalala 
A final specific elite actor who influenced the emergence and outcome of the 
janitors‘ campaign at the University of Miami was Donna Shalala, President of the 
University of Miami since 2001 and the former Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) during the eight years of the 
Clinton Administration.  Shalala, who had been a strong ―public advocate of universal 
healthcare coverage‖ during her tenure at HHS (Bierman 2005), was initially 
identified by SEIU as a potential ally in the organizing campaign (Amernick 2006).  
―Given who the president of the university is,‖ observed SEIU Executive Vice 
President Eliseo Medina, ―we actually expected this to go rather smoothly‖ (Meyerson 
2006).  SEIU expected that Shalala, a lifelong Democrat who presided over a 
university that had recently raised $1 billion in a single annual capital campaign and 
where tuition was $29,000 a year, would likely see the good sense in allowing UM‘s 
lowest-paid workers to form a labor union (Bierman 2005).  That expectation would 
be disappointed. 
Instead, Shalala consistently opposed the campaign while maintaining an 
official position of ‗neutrality‘ (Bierman 2005), insisting—in neoliberal fashion—that 
the janitors were already enjoying ‗market-based pay‘ (Fischl 2007: 534), supporting 
an opposition campaign led by the University‘s cleaning contractor, UNICCO 
(Boodhoo and Bierman 2006), and—probably illegally—orchestrating a pay raise for 
the workers in the middle of their union recognition drive (Albright 2008).  
Throughout the campaign, Shalala coupled her ―market-based pay‖ message—which, 
describing the average UM janitor‘s wage of $7.53 an hour (Bierman 2005), was 
technically, if sadly, accurate in Miami—with an insistence upon patience.  ―We have 
to let this union process run its course,‖ Shalala would say (Bierman 2005), while the 
specific dynamic of that ‗course‘ would be marked by the university‘s obstruction and 
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refusal to deal with the union (Meyerson 2006).  Market rational to the core, Shalala‘s 
was a position of laissez faire but not of laissez aller. 
The full course of Shalala‘s actions throughout the campaign, however, was 
ultimately characterized by a comic show of tragic hubris that usefully illustrates the 
historical salience of elite mistakes.  For on February 12, 2006, Shalala and her dog 
Sweetie appeared fatefully in a glossy photographic edition of The New York Times 
Magazine alongside a questionnaire piece entitled ―An Academic Retreat‖ (Lewine).  
The piece, describing Shalala‘s 9,000 square foot presidential residence off the 
campus of the University of Miami in Coral Gables, her Lexis hybrid SUV, Sweetie‘s 
four beds, her 29-foot motorboat, her fondness for vacationing in the kingdom of 
Bhutan, her ―1790 French country cabinet from the estate of the late Washington Post 
columnist Meg Greenfield,‖ and a number of other ‗lifestyle‘ details (Id.), was 
intended for a fairly limited readership in New York, Washington and a few other 
places in the U.S. where blue wrappers can be found on doorsteps in the morning.  
Perhaps Shalala had underestimated her adversary in SEIU, but in the context of the 
escalating organizing campaign, she had made available a few too many sharp details. 
The effect of the piece on the campaign, as will be revealed in more depth 
through Chapter 3, was to furnish concrete detail for discursive deployment in 
demonstration of the conflict‘s underlying dialectical tension.  As Democracy Now! 
would sum up the piece‘s ultimate impact with dependable tact, ―Shalala is now being 
criticized for living a life of luxury while the school‘s janitorial staff is living on about 
$50 a day‖ (2006).  Probably the most politically incendiary of the interview‘s 
revelations, in any case, was Shalala‘s answer to a question about the household chore 
about which she is least fastidious: ―Making my bed.  Fortunately, someone comes 
around and makes it for me‖ (Lewine 2006).  As journalist and blogger Barbara 
Ehrenreich, who visited workers on hunger strike near the end of the campaign, would 
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later ask in provocative response, ―Someone, Donna?‖  Through Shalala‘s misguided 
efforts to communicate her standing to other elites, she had inadvertently poured fuel 
on the fire of the public relations campaign against her own neoliberal managerial 
agenda.  It was as if someone had answered a Voltairean prayer by the workers to 
―make my enemies ridiculous‖ (Arouet 1767). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MATERIAL LIFE REIMAGINED 
Overview 
In antithetical contradiction to the pursuit of clean and homogeneous space for 
regional operations and habitation in Miami by international capitalist interests was 
the reality of life in Miami‘s neighborhoods.  Here, removed from the chilly 
abstraction of the offices, hotels and condominiums of Downtown Miami, Coral Way 
and Coral Gables was material life, with its humbly reiterated regularities, visceral 
exposure to ‗natural‘ determinants and inevitable specificities.  If the logic of Chapter 
2 was about the ruling abstractions of elite actors, this chapter addresses the 
descriptive and explanatory inadequacy of such abstractions at the level of the 
concrete particularities of everyday life, as the campaign came to reconstitute them 
discursively.  Here, assumptions of abstract identity gave way to the irreducible 
specificities of concrete phenomena, the elite reification of the ‗market wage‘ to a 
demand for the recognition of ‗worker dignity‘ and the privilege of historical 
experience. 
Braudel, who maintained a rather more static view of material life in his 
narrative of capitalist development from the 15
th
 through the 18
th
 centuries,
23
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 Braudel‟s overall tendency is to depict material life as relatively inert, at 
least in the period from the 15
th
 through the 18
th
 centuries with which his economic 
history of capitalist civilization chiefly concerns itself.  As Braudel explains it, “[t]he 
event is, or is taken to be, unique; the everyday happening is repeated, and the more 
often it is repeated the more likely it is to become a generality or rather a structure.  It 
pervades society at all levels and is characteristic of ways of being and behaving 
which are perpetuated through the endless ages” (1981: 29).  This is, at least, what 
Braudel tells us explicitly.  By showing, however, through his own construction of 
economic history, how these primary and most material economic relationships are 
carefully constituted and enshrined discursively in the first instance at levels of 
extreme specificity, Braudel‟s work on material life implies not only a strong 
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described this layer of social activity as an ―infra-economy, the informal other half of 
economic activity, the world of self-sufficiency and barter of goods and services 
within a very small radius‖ (1981: 24).  This zone—as both a narrowly ‗physical‘ 
place and a sphere of social relations—was not, of course, walled off from the market 
economy or entirely autonomous of the influences of capitalism; it could hardly be in 
dialectical relationship with ‗capitalism‘ if it were.  Rather, the specificity and 
indeterminacy of the relations of material life made capitalist access and market 
rationalization elusive and typically not very profitable.  Material life had to be 
inhabited and dwelt in for productive use, with careful attention to historical 
regularities, relationships and temporalities too particularized for final comprehension 
by a universal discourse of supply and demand oriented toward the maximization of 
profits.  Both living in and imagining material life required, in other words, a great 
deal of work. 
The relative autonomy and specific identity of material life in Miami, however, 
entailed a productive relational role as an actual or potential place for the absorption of 
capitalism‘s externalities, as, for instance, via the overt dumping of physical wastes, 
the amassing of reserve pools of unemployed deskilled workers, or the subsidization 
of prevailing local wages by uncompensated domestic labor.  Even here, however, 
capitalism‘s limited presence in material life was characterized by a kind of 
constitutive absence or indefinite deferral.  For if the logic of capitalism were really to 
                                                                                                                                            
(synchronic) inertia over the longue durée at this level, but also a weak (diachronic) 
possibility of sudden transformation or rupture.  Thus, for instance, Braudel gives the 
stiking example of “a drawing which shows Maximilian of Austria at table, in about 
1513: he is putting his hand into a dish.  Two centuries or so later, the Princess 
Palatine tells how Louis XIV, when he allowed his children to sit up to table for the 
first time, forbade them to eat differently from him, and in particular to eat with a fork 
as an overzealous tutor had taught them” (Id.).  Braudel‟s point is to emphasize the 
weight of these enduring continuities, but in counterpoint, he nonetheless 
provocatively asks: “So when did Europe invent table manners?” (Id.).   
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come to inhabit—rather than merely subsist from—these indissolubly specific 
relations, its own essential identity would ultimately be compromised by burdens of 
care.  Material life in Miami was, in this way, removed from the capitalist logic and 
process of relentless accumulation while simultaneously ―drawn into its operations‖ 
(Braudel 1981: 562) relationally and impacted by capitalism on an ever-increasing 
basis. 
We will approach a discussion of the contribution of material life to the play of 
the campaign through an examination of a number of the lived ‗structures‘ within and 
around which the campaign laid the concrete groundwork for its success, building up 
its challenge to the university‘s neoliberal managerial agenda through a superior basis 
within—and capacity to inhabit—a strategic ground of irreducible specificity.  The 
point here is to show, in contradistinction to the more static overall picture of early 
material life that Braudel gives in Civilization and Capitalism,
24
 how contemporary 
material life may have been progressively volatilized through increasing encroachment 
by and exposure to externalities from contemporary capitalism, which disembeds the 
organic relations of the former and unveils new possibilities for language.
25
  Aiming to 
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 I am, thus, making the self-conscious choice to relax Braudel‟s high 
structuralist approach to the economic relations of material life in early capitalism in 
order to register how the campaign exemplifies increasing opportunities in the 
contemporary capitalist environment for political contestation (the Gramscian 
contribution) and for possibilities rendered open through emergent discursive 
formations (the Heideggerian contribution).  This choice of structural relaxation is all 
the more compelling, by the terms of Braudel‟s own position, if the present 
conjuncture is, in fact, understood as a moment of systemic turbulence or 
„destructuration‟ (1984: 85). 
25
 Karl Polanyi makes something like this point in The Great Transformation 
(1944) when he explains that “[t]raditionally, land and labor are not separated; labor 
forms part of life, land remains part of nature, life and nature form an articulate whole.  
Land is thus tied up with the organization of kinship, neighborhood, craft, and creed—
with tribe and temple, village, guild, and church.  One Big Market, on the other hand, 
is an arrangement of economic life which includes markets for the factors of 
production.”  It is the product of a utopian and ultimately unsustainable fiction 
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understand the campaign‘s creative re-appropriation of the ‗lived space‘ of the 
university, we will examine how the campaign emerged in and through neighborhoods 
and homes, the church, the bodies of individual campaigners, specific contractual and 
administrative relations, didactic settings and the streets/roads of Coral Gables.  
Precisely through an emphasis on these concrete relations, as we shall see, the 
campaign introduced a more abstract political discussion about the nature of the 
underlying relations constituting the university. 
 
The Home, Neighborhood and Place of Dwelling 
One of the key places of emergence for the Miami janitors‘ campaign was in 
the home, neighborhood or place of dwelling.  Much of the momentum of the 
campaign depended, in short, on the creation of a dialectical tension between the 
specific realities of life on the ground in Miami‘s neighborhoods and the ‗clean space‘ 
of classrooms and offices in Coral Gables somehow assumed to be unrelated to those 
realities.  By emphasizing the workers‘ constitutive role as producers of and 
inhabitants of these physical and social spaces, the campaign made the workers visible 
as members of the community, legitimately at home in the university and recognized 
as its neighbors rather than naturalized or erased. 
Originally, as we saw in Chapter 1, of course, SEIU‘s campaign in South 
Florida got its start as an organizing drive aimed at the cleaners of condominiums on 
Miami Beach.  ―Initially,‖ reflected Reverend C.J. Hawking, ―this was just a condos 
campaign; UM just popped up‖ (2007).  Even after switching operations definitively 
to the more promising venue of the campus of the University of Miami, however, the 
organizing campaign remained as much about the essence and practice of home as it 
                                                                                                                                            
projected onto the more variegated complexities of humanity‟s actual material 
conditions (187). 
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was about the workplace or occupational conditions.  On one hand, the dual 
home/workplace theme bespoke anxiety related to increasing gentrification and space 
shortage in Miami during a period of unprecedented growth and real estate 
speculation.  As discussed in Chapter 2, rapidly rising housing costs in Miami-Dade 
County were far outstripping rises in wages during the period immediately prior to the 
campaign.  On another hand, the home/workplace duality addressed the collective and 
individual experiences of uprooting or social dislocation broadly characteristic of a 
metropolitan area in which more than 50 percent of the population—specifically more 
than 1.2 million individuals—were immigrants born abroad as of 2006 (U.S. Census 
Bureau).  ―Home‖ and ―workplace‖ were intimately dialectically related, as we shall 
see, not only in the nature of the janitors‘ alienated labor as cleaners of the real 
property of others but also in the specific history of their campaign activities aiming to 
change the nature of these relations.   
A primary way the campaign brought its message ‗home,‘ as it were, was 
through the workers‘ prolonged encampment at the ―Freedom City‖ tent village, just 
off the University of Miami campus, where more than a dozen workers and several 
students literally took up residence for the better part of two months.  Occupying a 
space under the Miami Metro line, in a long isthmus of public land across Ponce de 
Leon Boulevard from the University of Miami campus, the janitors and their supports 
used the tent village as a base of operations and a symbol of their movement against 
the university.  The campaign resorted to this tenuous outpost—bounded on the other 
side by the heavily congested U.S. Route 1—mainly because the university had 
prohibited striking workers from ―trespassing‖ at their campus jobsite (Corbishley 
2006), and this location was the closest possible alternative to UM property.
26
  The 
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 To foreshadow the theoretical analysis a bit, in the words of Heidegger, ―A 
space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, 
namely, within a boundary, the Greek peras.  A boundary is not that at which 
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spot also offered a high level of visibility to passing traffic, including most traffic 
entering the UM campus, and was convenient to a campus church that, as we shall see, 
provided another important shelter for the workers throughout the campaign.  Barbara 
Ehrenreich, who visited ―Freedom City‖ at the end of the hunger strike, described it in 
rather eloquent detail: ―Freedom City looks more like a hamlet when we get there—
three large tents, one filled with cots for the campers, a few pup tents erected by 
student supporters, and about a dozen strikers sitting in a circle of folding chairs and 
talking in Spanish.  It‘s an odd patch of real estate, this thin strip of dust and grass 
under the elevated metro track, where trains rushing overhead periodically cancel all 
conversation‖ (2006).  According to Ehrenreich, Freedom City served as a vital 
aggregation spot for the workers, a site for their animated political debate and strategy 
discussions (2006).  Apart from representing a literal base of occupation and strategic 
operations, however, the tent village reflected an established trope in the symbolic 
vocabulary of the U.S. labor movement, echoing such memorable prior encampments 
as Caesar Chavez‘s 1968 United Farm Workers‘ tent city in Delano, California 
(United Farm Workers 2009) and the United Mine Workers‘ ―Camp Solidarity‖ that 
housed union partisans in the course of the 1989-90 Pittston Coal campaign (Beckwith 
2000).  The Freedom City tent encampment was the campaign‘s real and symbolic 
home at the campus, its outpost, strategic front and pied-à-terre. 
A more literal residence from which the campaign unfolded, through direct 
worker leadership, was that of Feliciano Hernandez, a former secretary general of a 
communication workers‘ syndicate in Cuba and now a shop steward at UM for Local 
11.  Hernandez, who thinks of his union leadership role in Miami as fundamentally the 
same as it was in Cuba some 30 years ago, describes his objective as acting ―to defend 
                                                                                                                                            
something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which 
something begins its essential unfolding.  That is why the concept is that of horismos, 
that is, the horizon, the boundary‖ (1977: 332-33). 
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the right of the worker,‖ which he believes is endangered in both settings (2007).  One 
of the most senior and best-compensated of the workers at UM, Hernandez made his 
humble but comparatively spacious Miami residence, located near a public park just 
north of Coral Gables, available for convening meetings during the weeks leading up 
to the strike.  Hernandez‘s home served as the site where his co-workers and SEIU 
organizers gathered to draft an initial demand letter to UNICCO concerning 
Hernandez‘s brief retaliatory suspension from the UM jobsite in February 2006, and it 
also housed a decisive gathering of workers to debate whether and how to pursue the 
plans for their partial strike action (Hernandez 2007).     
Underscoring the dialectical tension it identified between material life and the 
realm of elite actors, the campaign also juxtaposed the domestic conditions of low-
paid service workers trying to make ends meet in Miami with the more-than-
comfortable home life that Donna Shalala managed to publicize for it through her 
interview piece in the New York Times Magazine (See Chapter 2).  Miami in the 
middle of the decade, as we have seen, was a city in which the poor were increasingly 
being priced out of their homes and neighborhoods by an explosive demand for new 
housing and office space and by a disastrous trend of real estate speculation that would 
leave enduring marks on a number of the major cities of the world.  Barbara 
Ehrenreich‘s blog report from Miami on May 2, 2006 is a document of one way the 
campaign brought the dialectical tension inherent in this moment to the forefront.  
After describing her rushed research trip to Miami, the scene at Freedom City and the 
state of the organizing campaign as it was drawing toward a victory that would not 
become an accomplished fact until June 15, Ehrenreich‘s blog entry narrates a visit 
she paid to the home of one of the striking janitors, a Nicaraguan-American woman 
named Leonor who, about 40 years old, lives in a dilapidated home in Liberty City, 
Miami‘s poorest neighborhood, with her husband and two children.  Leonor, who 
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fasted for 17 days during the hunger strike, had been earning a $6.75 hourly wage—
with no meaningful benefits—for her work cleaning classrooms prior to Shalala‘s 
mid-campaign pay raise.  Ehrenrich describes her visit to Leonor‘s home as follows: 
 
 
I‘m trying to absorb all the complexities when we pull 
up to Maria Leonor Ramirez‘s tiny house.  Her husband 
shows us into the living room and chairs are rearranged 
in a rough triangle.  I can‘t help noticing that the floor is 
missing several boards, leaving foot-long two-inch-deep 
canyons to trip the unwary, and that the armchair I‘m 
offered is battered beyond the help of duct tape.  There 
is no TV or any other electronic device in sight, and 
only a family photo and a couple of public school 
diplomas on the wall, but the place is spotlessly clean.  
Obviously the work of a professional. 
While Leonor offers everyone juice, my mind drifts to 
an account of Donna Shalala‘s digs in a recent New 
York Times profile… 
(Ehrenreich 2006) 
 
By revealing the domicile of a worker such as Leonor to a journalist such as 
Ehrenreich, positioned as the latter was to recognize and publicize its inflammatory 
political dimensions, the campaign had become both highly sensitive to and quite 
articulate about its basis in Miami‘s homes and neighborhoods.  Leanor‘s home, 
‗obviously the work of a professional,‘ had been passed into the hands of another.  
The campaign, moreover, fostered the workers‘ sense of empowerment over 
the campus space and within the neighborhood and community of the university by 
establishing them in the specific location of ―Freedom City,‖ where they could be ―at 
home‖ to receive guests, visitors and allies.  The workers‘ tent encampment became a 
kind of festival space, to which, as Professor Giovanna Pompele put it, ―people would 
bring out their entire families, nieces, nephews, etc.  Everyone would come out.  It 
was not mournful but cheery‖ (2006).  Feliciano Hernandez reflected that several of 
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the women involved in the campaign would leave their homes at 6 a.m. and not return 
until midnight, bringing their children to the tent city.  One such child, according to 
Hernandez, was especially beloved among the janitors, a young man named Christian 
who regularly accompanied his grandmother to the picket site and began to channel 
the Justice for Janitors standard of ―Sí, se puede [Yes it can be accomplished]‖ 
(Hernandez 2007), as adopted from the repertoire of Caesar Chavez‘s UFW. 
Starting with the faith community and reaching out to activists among students 
and faculty, the campaign‘s festive coalition of visitors and supporters crossed lines of 
race, ethnicity, economic status, class, gender, educational background, and religion.  
Pompele describes witnessing during the campaign a ―palpable sense of solidarity 
across language and class that may be enduring‖ at UM (2006).  A particularly 
memorable realization of this sense of community occurred one Friday afternoon 
when a group of workers, who were gathered in a ―raucous salsa line‖ at their 
encampment under the elevated metro track on U.S. Route 1, were joined by a march 
of more than three hundred faculty and students that had ―wound serpentine through 
the campus‖ (Fischl 2007: 520) toward Freedom City in a show of support.  Reverend 
C. J. Hawking, who also witnessed the convergence of the groups, with faculty and 
students embracing the workers who clean their offices and classrooms, described the 
moment as ―such a breakdown of class and race,‖ possibly even an intimation of 
―what the kingdom of God is supposed to be like‖ (Hawking 2007). 
Finally, the campaign articulated the workers‘ concerns about ‗home‘ with a 
broader set of movements in Miami‘s civil society increasingly concerned with the 
quality of neighborhood life and the empowerment of the poor.  At the level of 
concrete social formations, the UM campaign contributed to the strengthening of 
several such specific organizations and constituencies in Miami.  Bruce Nissen, 
director of research at the Center for Labor Research and Studies at Florida 
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International University (FIU) and convener of FIU‘s Research Institute on Social and 
Economic Policy (RISEP), has suggested that in the absence of a strong preexisting 
activist community in Miami, SEIU had been in the process of actively building up a 
―social justice infrastructure‖ to support its pioneering organizing campaigns in health 
care and building services in the city (Nissen and Russo 2007: 153).  In the case of the 
campaign at UM, in addition to the student and faculty groups the union helped 
organize, the greatest such beneficiary was South Florida Interfaith Worker Justice 
(SFIWJ), which had been a small and relatively ineffective local outpost of the 
national Interfaith Worker Justice committee (IWJ) prior to the janitors‘ campaign.  
The expansion of SFIWJ resulted from the union‘s direct solicitation of help from 
IWJ, which frequently collaborates with SEIU and other unions, in the mutually 
interesting project of significant new community organizing in Miami.  According to 
Brakken, IWJ offered SEIU‘s Miami campaign the assistance of Reverend C.J. 
Hawking, who ―agreed to come down and help build the Interfaith Committee in south 
Florida‖ based on significant prior experience organizing clergy in the context of labor 
struggles in the upper midwest (Brakken 2007).  In addition to precipitating a 
leadership change at SFIWJ and new hiring at the organization, the campaign at UM 
positioned SFIWJ for grant funding it has received recently from several national 
foundations impressed with the organization‘s work as a local social catalyst 
(Hawking 2007). 
Beyond SFIWJ, a number of other local groups were drawn into the campaign 
or shared its broad interest in the homes and neighborhoods of Miami‘s poor.  These 
included the Miami Workers‘ Center—which deals with concerns around 
gentrification and housing, the Quaker Peace Center, the Florida Peace and Justice 
Network, and South Florida Jobs with Justice, all of which provided support during 
the campaign (Coker-Dukowitz 2006; Brakken 2006).  A related impact of the UM 
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campaign, moreover, involves South Florida Jobs with Justice, whose leaders were 
inspired by SEIU‘s successful efforts at community organizing among working-class 
Cuban-Americans.  In light of the campaign at UM, Jobs with Justice became 
convinced that Miami‘s working-class Latino/Latina communities were, in fact, 
excellent organizing environments and undertook an organizing project of its own in 
Miami‘s Little Havana.  Known as Vecinos Unidos (Neighbors United), the project is 
now a significant part of Miami‘s incrementally growing social justice community 
(Brakken 2007).  Finally, although it was not involved in the campaign directly, 
another resonant group in Miami was Take Back the Land, a movement of homeless 
squatters and shanty dwellers that built up the Umoja Village encampment, with which 
Coker-Dukowitz and other STAND activists became involved following their work on 
the campaign at UM (Arthur 2007).  Professor Giovanna Pompele believes that the 
students‘ involvement in UMOJA village may have ―followed from the optimism‖ 
characteristic of their success at the university (2006).  After Umoja Village‘s 
destruction by fire in April 2007, Take Back the Land has been increasingly vocally 
engaged in the ongoing debate about housing in South Florida and recently received 
national attention for a campaign involving homeless squatters in appropriating homes 
abandoned to foreclosure in and around Miami (Leland 2009). 
 
The Church 
The church was a second—perhaps paradoxically ‗material‘ and quotidian—
site for the emergence of the campaign.  Christian symbolism of a distinctly dialectical 
sort was literally ubiquitous throughout the campaign and perhaps best exemplified by 
the exhibition of ―three large crosses made of brooms—the broom being the ancient 
and traditional janitorial tool‖ outside the janitors‘ tents at Freedom City (Ehrenreich 
2006).  Beyond overt symbolism, however, the campaign made highly instrumental 
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material use of church property, as in the case of Father Frank Corbishley‘s ―strike 
sanctuary.‖  Like ―Freedom City,‖ the ―strike sanctuary,‖ as Corbishley explains, 
housed in the St. Bede Episcopal Chapel on the UM campus, emerged as a result of 
the strikers‘ exclusion from UM property (2006).  The chapel, located on land owned 
by the Episcopal Diocese of South Florida, as deeded to the Diocese by UM in 1951, 
was, incidentally, built with funds donated by Jean Flagler Matthews, granddaughter 
of railroad tycoon Henry Flagler (St. Bede Episcopal Chapel 2009), who first made 
Miami accessible to the northeastern United States by rail (See Chapter 2, supra).  The 
church property, according to Corbishley, became ―like a mini-embassy‖ during the 
course of the campaign, welcoming the workers, who converged there every morning 
and used the church as a meeting space, place of instruction and point of departure for 
their many strike activities throughout the greater Miami area and elsewhere, 
including the attempt to spread their campaign to workers at Nova Southeastern 
university, the day of solidarity at the Miami International Airport, and visits to the 
homes of individual workers (2006). 
Throughout the campaign, the clergy acted as the ―glue‖ that held the 
community supporting the campaign together (Fischl 2006), providing support that ran 
the gamut from special sermons and letters of spiritual concern to acts of civil 
disobedience, the anointing of hunger striking workers, and the provision of 
alternative classroom venues for professors and students respecting the workers‘ 
picket lines (Alter 2006).  The first act the striking workers took, having begun leaving 
their jobsites on the evening of Tuesday, February 28, the day before Ash Wednesday, 
was to attend a noontime Mass at the Saint Augustine Catholic Church across the 
street from the University of Miami School of Law, where they received ashes from 
Father Richard Mullen, a Catholic priest who would hold several Masses for the 
workers during the campaign and pay them visits at their picket line (Hawking 2006).  
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The Ash Wednesday Mass had been carefully orchestrated by Reverend Hawking, 
who also arranged a Sunday Mass for the workers on March 5, the first Sunday of 
Lent, led by Felipe Estévez, the Bishop of Miami (Hawking 2006).  Estévez, himself a 
refugee from Cuba who had first come to Miami on a Pedro Pan flight in the 1960s, 
used the occasion to relate deep personal stories from his own experience in 
Revolutionary Cuba to the struggle the workers had recently initiated (Hawking 2006).  
Here was a remarkably seamless convergence of clerical and social justice interests, of 
the residual politics of the Cold War and the emergent politics of an increasingly self-
aware cohort of post-industrial service workers.  As Feliciano Hernandez, a UM 
janitor and devout Catholic originally from Cuba, interpreted his interaction with the 
religious leaders who supported the strike, ―If I didn‘t have faith, I couldn‘t be in this 
fight. The church is the same.  We are for the same cause‖ (Alter 2006). 
A number of the clergy, finally, were quite self-conscious about their roles as 
intermediaries vis-à-vis material life, on one hand, and the privileged domain of 
capitalist actors, on another.  As Reverend Hawking, who came to Miami to organize 
church leaders, explained, ―[t]he clergy recognized the connection between the 
[decline of the] labor movement and their homeless kitchens‖ (2006).  But this 
understanding was more profound than an insight about the connection between 
market power and distributive inequality.  The clergy, by positing affirmative values 
that supervened market fundamentalism, gave the lie to the notion that ―there is no 
alternative.‖  In the words of Plantation United Methodist Pastor Tim Smiley, a 
clergyman in neighboring Broward County who was involved tangentially in the UM 
campaign and became a strong supporter of the unsuccessful attempt to organize 
workers at Nova Southeastern University that grew out of the UM campaign, ―[t]he 
Prophets of the Old Testament and Jesus in the New Testament spoke to people in 
institutions of power.  God‘s message of social justice, shalom, includes justice being 
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lived out.  People who are in a position of power have an affirmative obligation to the 
poor, the widow, the orphan, the alien or migrant‖ (2006).  Father Frank Corbishley 
echoed similarly ‗radical‘ Christian sentiments in connection with his own view of the 
campaign, observing, ―I believe that my faith calls me to this…  I believe it is immoral 
for us to finance our prosperity on the backs of the poor‖ (2006). 
 
The Body 
The campaign, thirdly, emerged in and through the individual bodies of 
workers, students, clergy, professors and others who participated in its enactment.  
This corporeal quality of the campaign, lived as it was out of doors in tents, under 
springtime tropical weather conditions, was a very real part of the campaign‘s 
everyday experience as relayed in most narratives and memories of the events, and not 
only from the point of view of endurance and suffering, either.  Coker-Dukowitz, for 
instance, recounts camping outside the UM admissions office in the course of one of 
the student protest actions when the university turned on its sprinkler system.  The 
students adjusted to the irrigation of their campsite by staging an aquatic event they 
called ―slip-and-slide for justice‖ that drew even more attention to the righteousness of 
their cause (2006). 
It was through the hunger strike, however, that the campaign most completely 
engaged the bodies of participants.  Originating as a strategic idea of the workers 
themselves and beginning among a core group of 15 participants on April 5, the 
hunger strike spanned the better part of a month, transforming into a broader 
movement of serial fasts by April 21 and definitively concluding on May Day, with 
wide public attention and celebrity participation (See Chapter 1).  As Feliciano 
Hernandez, one of the workers who pressed for the hunger strike explained, ―[t]he 
leadership of the union always opposed itself to the hunger strike, but when they 
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began seeing…  that there wasn‘t a light at the end of the tunnel, they decided…  that 
they had no choice but to go [deeper] into the tunnel‖ (Hernandez 2007) in deference 
to the intuition of the workers.  Despite the union‘s initial resistance to the potential 
health, legal and publicity risks involved, the workers went ahead with the action, 
SEIU sending in a nurse to monitor participants‘ wellbeing (Hawking 2006). 
As Professor Giovanna Pompele described the hunger strike, ―[t]hese workers 
are a force of nature.  They would easily have let themselves die.  The union reigned 
them in.  It had to…  The union was mostly telling them how to chill out‖ (2006).  The 
final step in the campaign‘s creative strategy of escalation, the hunger strike endowed 
the workers‘ cause with complex symbolic power and stark materiality.  Begun during 
the period of the Christian Lenten fast, the hunger strike linked the workers‘ struggle 
to a powerful substantive tradition of spiritual transcendence connected to the 
Christian mystery of the corporeal embodiment of the living God among men.  In 
addition to amplifying the social degradation and exploitation to which the workers 
believed they had been exposed at UM, the hunger strike offered specific evidence of 
the overabundant reserve of spiritual and emotional energy that the workers involved 
could bring to bear in their collective struggle.  In Pompele‘s words, these workers 
were ―enduring, incredibly politicized, incredibly motivated, and as strong as 
mountains‖ (2006).  The event was by no means merely a weapon of the weak. 
By dramatizing hunger, a tangible reality for the families of workers earning 
$6.40 an hour, the workers attached their wage demands to the moral authority of their 
needs, situating their individual lives, as revealed throughout the campaign to broader 
constituencies via extensive local and national media attention (e.g. Boodhoo 2006a-h; 
Rabin 2006; Democracy Now! 2006; Ehrenreich 2006; Meyerson 2006), within 
Miami‘s larger social patterns of extremely concentrated wealth, ethnic balkanization, 
and acute urban poverty.  The idea of ‗need‘ assumed a metaphysical significance in 
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the hunger strike that was not exclusively theological but glaringly material and 
revealed in its connection with an essential ‗dignity‘ that could not be rationalized 
away.  It was, indeed, a pervasive social reality of Miami that had hitherto remained 
suppressed.  As Reverend C. J. Hawking underscores, paraphrasing the words of 
Martin Luther King Jr., ―When an injustice is being ignored, you have to foster a 
creative tension so that it can be no longer ignored‖ (Hawking 2007).  By most 
accounts, in the wake of the campaign at UM, the ―creative tension‖ in Miami is 
growing. 
 
The Wage Relation 
Fourth, to the extent that it impacted their qualitative transformation, the 
campaign emerged in material instances of the janitors‘ wage relation.  Reflecting on 
his overall experience of employment in the United States—including time spent in 
California as well as South Florida— in addition to his specific experience as a janitor 
at UM, Feliciano Hernandez observed that there is no essential difference between 
labor relations in the contemporary U.S. and slavery, ―just different forms of living 
and experiencing it; we continue to be slaves…  Now we work for a low wage and 
spend it all consuming‖ (2007).  The matter of the living wage was certainly one thing 
the campaign had in mind when it referred to ‗worker dignity.‘  ―People who are 
working full time in any endeavor deserve to be making a living wage.  They deserve 
to be able to support themselves‖ (Smiley 2006), at very least.  There was also the 
matter of psychologically abusive and physically dangerous workplace practices.   
Father Corbishley, for instance, observed that, at a health fair hosted by the Chapel in 
December 2005, he learned of numerous occupational injuries at UM stemming from 
the inhalation of dangerous chemicals in cleaning agents (2006).  Attesting to the 
derision with which the workers at UM were regularly treated prior to the campaign, 
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he additionally recalled the story of an aged female janitor who related to him that her 
UNICCO supervisor regularly referred to her as ―una mierda vieha [an old shit]‖ 
(2006).  Endeavoring to explain the ineffectiveness of Shalala‘s mid-campaign pay 
raise in halting the momentum of the campaign, Barbara Ehrenreich observed, ―the big 
sticking point is that the workers don‘t want to be ‗given‘ anything.  They want a 
union contract.  All day, the word ‗dignity‘ keeps popping up in one language or 
another‖ (2006).  The question of ‗dignity‘ in the campaign was not just about the life 
conditions of the workers or their desire for recognition as people—although these 
were very important matters—nor merely a cynical euphemism for the union‘s 
obvious interest in walking away with a definitive collective agreement.  The matter of 
‗dignity,‘ went to the very question of the agency of this group of workers, to their 
specific and deeply world-historical experience as shapers of material reality and its 
disclosure. 
 
The Administrative Space 
Fifth, the campaign emerged in the material relations of administrative space 
on the campus.  The occupation of the University of Miami admissions office (See 
Chapter 1) by a group of undergraduate students led by Coker-Dukowitz and his 
colleagues from Students Toward a New Democracy (STAND), aided only by 
Campus Chaplain Frank Corbishley, who was forced to stand in the office vestibule 
surrounded by police during crucial negotiations between the students and Shalala 
(Corbishley 2006; Fischl 2006), exemplifies the material realities and stakes of the 
campaign‘s escalatory process in administrative spaces.  It was one key way the 
campaign made office space, as it were, understood in its concrete materiality as a 
contested domain.  The University called in the police to surround the office, turned 
off air conditioning to make it uncomfortable for the students inside, and denied the 
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students access to restroom facilities or water (Coker-Dukowitz 2006; Corbishley 
2006).  As Corbishley describes it, the administration fostered a ―climate of fear that 
was pervasive on campus‖ (2006).  In the case of the student occupation, from the 
perspective of a savvy group of students trained by United Students Against 
Sweatshops in direct action tactics and ―mostly composed of powerful women,‖ the 
University was ―able to create a pressure cooker within the admissions office; they 
created the sense that the police were surrounding us outside, with a paddy wagon out 
back.  They amped it up in a visual sense…  All our nerves were shot‖ (Coker-
Dukowitz 2006).   
Nonetheless, the students held their ground in the admissions office, in part 
with the encouragement of a group of workers and other campaign supporters who 
held a vigil for them outside.  When Shalala eventually came to negotiate, the students 
ended up involving her in a protracted late-night undergraduate debate (Coker-
Dukowitz 2006).  The way the students managed the power imbalance vis-à-vis the 
president of their university was to appoint a student facilitator of the talks and to 
establish the simple rule of engagement that everyone, including Shalala, raise her 
hand and be recognized before speaking (Id.).  Shalala‘s strategy in the talks, as 
Coker-Dukowitz assesses it, ―was to talk us to death‖ (Id.).  The conversation lasted 
four hours.  Nonetheless, the students did go home with a set of concessions, thirteen 
hours after the beginning of their ordeal, at 1:40 the following morning (Coker-
Dukowitz 2006; Hawking 2006).  Shalala agreed to make a statement renouncing 
intimidation or harassment of supporters of the campaign on campus, and she agreed 
to hold a meeting to address the concerns of three estates: the students, the university 
administration and the representatives of the workers (Coker-Dukowitz 2006).  In 
Corbishley‘s opinion, this was a decisive moment in the campaign: ―for the first time, 
the workers got a seat at the table‖ (2006).  It was moreover, quite a material 
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accomplishment for the seventeen students involved.  ―These students...  I was so 
impressed with them,‖ observed Father Corbishley.  ―Here are a bunch of twenty-year-
olds going head-to-head with a former cabinet secretary‖ (Id.). 
 
The Classroom 
In a sixth instance, the campaign emerged in the classroom through professors 
and students who were forced ‗outside‘—either literally or, at least in one critical case, 
conceptually—into (a recognition of) the material realities of their campus.  
Altogether, beginning as early as March 2 and lasting through the Spring Break—
during which Shalala raised the janitors‘ wages on March 16—more than 100 faculty 
at UM held between 200 and 400 classes off campus, ―under the palm trees,‖ in the 
evocative words of Hawking, as well as in a variety of other spaces provided by the 
clergy (Fischl 2007; Hawking 2006; Pompele 2006).  One common outdoor venue was 
the green space at the corner of Granada Boulevard and U.S. Route 1, which Miami 
Herald columnist Nicholas Spangler described as ―an unlovely patch of grass with a 
few unshading trees.  Last fall it became a mulching ground for the summer‘s 
hurricane debris‖ (2006).  Spangler elaborated in significant detail the improvised 
classroom of one UM sociology professor, Elizabeth Aranda, who was using the park: 
―[i]t was very hot, there were bugs crawling around her nonclassroom and she was 
sunburned.  She‘d had a long day and she was tired‖ (Id.).  In Spangler‘s narrative of 
Aranda‘s class, Aranda, who is wearing a strike t-shirt fashioned by her 7-year-old 
daughter, is literally approached by a man riding by the park on a bicycle who 
interrupts her to ask Aranda what a ―living wage‖ means ―anyway.‖  Aranda ventures 
a thoughtful response, which includes an encompassing relational explanation, and 
then the man on the bike responds with a flirtation before riding off again.  Aranda‘s 
response to the encounter is an apt sigh (Id.).  The story, in addition to whatever else it 
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demonstrates, attests to the manner in which the campaign introduced unusual new 
articulations of academic and broader communities around the campus through 
departures from the habitual.  The grove of academe, in short, was qualitatively 
transformed as it became a real ‗outside‘ space; it became, as it were, more 
‗original.‘27  Other, perhaps more controlled, examples of such transformation of 
instructional space included a teach-in held by the faculty and students in support of 
the strike, a film festival organized by Professor John Lennon of UM‘s American 
Studies department, and the separate showing of a documentary on Wal-Mart 
(Pompele 2006). 
A no less significant specific way the campaign emerged in the classroom at 
UM was through a substantive enrichment of the curriculum.  Michael Fischl, in a law 
review article entitled ―The Other Side of the Picket Line: Contract, Democracy and 
Power in a Law School Classroom‖—published in connection with a conference at 
Harvard Law School on ―Teaching from the Left‖— provides specific detail of such 
curricular enrichment in nothing short of the material of a first-year course in contract 
law.  Fischl, despite his extremely instrumental role in the faculty support for the 
campaign, judiciously declined arbitrarily to take his first-year contract course off 
campus without a democratic poll of his students‘ preferences conducted via an 
anonymous online forum by the student government representatives of the class 
                                                 
27
 I mean ‗original‘ here in the double sense of ‗generative‘ and ‗authentic.‘  
The original image of ―academia‖ in the tradition of the West—for what it‘s worth—
an image which first comes to us from Plato, is indeed, I would argue, significantly 
less controlled than most institutionalized academic spaces of the present era, 
notwithstanding Athenian society‘s many exclusions based on gender and status as 
freeman or slave.  Socrates‘ chance encounter and walk into the countryside with 
Phaedrus in that dialogue and the robust comic dramaturgy of the Symposium provide 
two classic cases in point.  Inquiry, in the early and middle dialogues of Plato, 
advances principally through Socrates‘ rigorously skeptical but essentially open 
comportment toward the individuals and thoughts he encounters. 
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(2007)
28
.  When those preferences came in, the 80 voters out of a class of 106 
narrowly favored remaining on the law school campus, with 35 favoring off-campus 
classes, 40 favoring on on-campus classes, and 5 ―other‖ votes proving indecisive 
(2007: 525).  Fischl and his contract class ―stayed put,‖ but the campaign refused to let 
them off the hook (Id.).  When Fischl explicitly opened discussion of the polling 
results with his class and reviewed the rationales students gave in a ―comment‖ option, 
the students desiring to remain on campus, he said, typically ventured relatively 
traditional ‗contractual duty‘ arguments substantively anchored in the assertion that 
―this isn‘t what I paid for‖ (i.e. that asking the law students to attend classes off 
campus introduced a novel inconvenience to which no student consented when he 
enrolled for classes and paid his tuition) (Id. 526).  Fischl likened this response to an 
anonymous email comment that he received from an ―angry dad‖ of one of the 
students who alleged a ―complete disregard of [my] duty to [my] students, contractual 
and otherwise‖ (Id. 526-30).  So much for the ‗obligations‘ arguments of the ‗right.‘ 
What surprised and initially troubled Fischl, however, was that his students 
who supported the striking janitors did not venture the perfectly valid—and brilliantly 
combative—counter-argument by which the ―this isn‘t what I paid for‖ line could be 
―flipped‖ and redeployed (Fischl 2007: 529).  Students desiring to respect the janitors‘ 
picket line, after all, could have gone toe-to-toe with the exponents of ‗contractual 
duty‘ by insisting that they didn‘t ―pay for‖ the prospect of crossing a picket line to get 
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 As Fischl describes his philosophical ambivalence about taking classes off 
campus, ―[t]here was, of course, nothing ‗pure‘ about teaching classes off campus as a 
means of honoring the picket line, since we were still teaching  and thereby enabling 
the University to continue its operations without substantial interruption.‖  The issue 
came up again later in the campaign in specific reference to a faculty debate—among 
the ―comitato‖ of faculty convened to develop strategy in support of the janitors (See 
Chapter 1)—about whether  to resume on-campus teaching after Spring Break, in light 
of Shalala‘s mid-campaign wage concession.  The comitato ultimately decided to go 
back to campus at that point, urging the faculty to ―seek other ways to express 
solidarity with the janitors‖ (2007: 120). 
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to class at a university whose cleaning contractor was in the process of an on-site anti-
union campaign (Id. 530).  Instead, Fischl‘s ‗left-wing‘ students resorted to arguments 
that were significantly weaker in law but appealed to ‗higher‘ norms involving the 
democratic governance of the workplace, which contract knows not (Id. 530).  Fischl 
was puzzled for some time until remembering, in the words of one of his students—
applied to the concrete cases of workplace and classroom settings—that ―there are 
some things that are just too important for contract‖ (Id. 530, 535).  Accordingly, as is 
usually the case in law as elsewhere, ―context matters, and it must be recalled that 
these students were embracing [the ideal of ‗democracy‘] for settings in which it isn‘t 
ordinarily welcome—i.e. in the workplace and the classroom, realms in which market 
discipline is increasingly understood as the best and most legitimate source of 
governance‖ (Id. 534).  Fischl concludes that ―the reluctance of the janitors‘ student 
supporters to join the ‗this isn‘t what I paid for‘ refrain may thus have reflected a 
healthy skepticism about the role of market values in higher education, whether 
workplace or classroom governance is at stake‖ (Id. 534-35).  By working through 
these matters with his students and colleagues in concretely material practices of 
teaching and writing, Fischl‘s openness to the campaign had made possible a first-rate 
―teachable moment‖ (Id. 526) and contributed, moreover, to a blistering critique of 
neoliberal contract theory from within. 
 
The Road 
In a seventh and final instance, the campaign emerged in the articulate public 
space of the roadway.  As we have seen—in ways that should be unsurprising to 
anyone familiar with the automotive culture of South Florida—roads and highways 
were very important spaces for the concrete emergence of the campaign.  Nearly 
anyone attempting to visit the campus, including riders of the Miami Metro line and 
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drivers from the north or south along U.S. Route 1, would necessarily pass by 
Freedom City, with all its symbolic tropes and its signs entreating motorists to ―Honk 
for Justice‖ (Ehrenreich 2006).  Nor was the campaign‘s articulation with the roadway 
merely positional and auditory.  The campaign‘s major activities, including the action 
that blocked traffic on U.S. Route 1 and its numerous marches on and around the 
campus—whether to Freedom City, Corbishley‘s Strike Sanctuary or the legendary 
home of the president—involved taking to the streets or the road, pounding the 
pavement in the old manner (See Chapter 1).  This physical presence of bodies in 
Miami‘s streets and roadways was a fundamental fact of the campaign and a mark of 
its radical departure from the norm of a city in which automobiles enjoy a kind of first 
priority and human bodies rarely mingle in public except in air conditioned malls, 
wind-swept beaches and velvet-roped nightclubs.  As we have seen, the departure led 
to the arrest and jailing of a number of clergy (See Chapter 1) and was by no means 
welcomed by a police force that brought with it practical knowledge about successful 
crowd repression from the experience of containing demonstrations against the 
November 2003 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) ministerial conference in 
Miami‘s downtown business district (See Chapter 1). 
There was something about the road, however, that went to the very heart of 
what the campaign accomplished in Miami‘s material life, to the nature of its essential 
emergence, means of transmission and lasting effects beyond formal conclusion in 
contract.  This, I argue, involved what Mikhail Bakhtin, in the context of the novelistic 
discourse, described as ―chronotopic values,‖ spatiotemporal domains that refuse the 
segmentation of time and space as separate entities apart from the emotions and values 
that attach to them (1981: 243).
29
  Bakhtin‘s ―chronotope of the road,‖ which he 
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Although Bakhtin is concerned principally with novelistic discourse, and thus 
with a kind of „fine art,‟ his reflections are particularly helpful in getting at dimensions 
of the novel political imagination of the campaign, as mediated by its discourse and 
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figures as one kind of temporality that emerges in the diverse ‗heteroglot‘ and 
‗dialogic‘ unfolding of (novelistic and other) discourse (Id. 269-75), is associated with 
the chance encounter.  ―On the road,‖ explains Bakhtin, ―the spatial and temporal 
paths of the most varied people—representatives of all social classes, estates, 
religions, nationalities, ages—intersect at one spatial and temporal point.  People who 
are normally kept separate by social and spatial distance can accidentally meet; any 
contrast may crop up, the most various fates may collide and interweave with one 
another.  On the road the spatial and temporal series defining human fates and lives 
combine with one another in distinctive ways, even as they become more complex and 
more concrete by the collapse of social distances‖ (Id. 243).  Bakhtin explains that the 
chronotope of the road is ―both a point of new departures and a place for events to find 
their denouement.  Time, as it were, fuses together with space and flows in it (forming 
the road)‖ (Id. 244).  ―Varied and multi-leveled,‖ says Bakhtin, ―are the ways in which 
road is turned into metaphor, but its fundamental pivot is the flow of time‖ (Id. 244).  
The campaign‘s key achievement—exceeding even the ‗ultimate‘ moment in which 
the union‘s well-earned bargaining power was leveraged in exchange for wage and 
benefit concessions vis-à-vis a market for alienated labor power—was to place itself in 
such a flow of time, to take to the road and affirm the fragile dignity of everyday 
material experience in the city.  As a simple but sophisticated discursive articulation in 
concrete social space, the campaign thrived in a chronotope of the road.  
Unprecedented in Miami, this was a far greater achievement than the labor contract 
and may well long survive it. 
                                                                                                                                            
enacted as a practical political matter.  Aesthetics, in a sense, are never fully separable 
from the social conditions of their arising and continued relevance, namely a deeply 
historical ritual relevance based in communal enactment (Benjamin 1968: 224).  When 
we posit that art is so separable, we risk ceding art as a domain of contestation to a 
violently appropriative tendency in capitalism to seek the hypostasis of aesthetic forms 
and the aesthetic stage-management of society (Id.). 
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In short, the campaign unfolded from the relations of material life because its 
key constituencies were—at least in part—‗there,‘ reliant on the irreducible 
specificities of this ‗zone‘ even as some of their projects took place in more formal 
‗market‘ relations.  Turning this only apparent positional disadvantage around, the 
campaign sought to undermine the university‘s superior basis in market relations 
through a more subtle discourse with greater fidelity to the concrete and to deploy the 
symbolism of material life in politicized contrast with the university‘s elitism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
POLITICIZATION OF AND RESOLUTION WITHIN 
THE MARKET ECONOMY 
 
Standing in dialectical relationship to capitalism, on one side, and material life, 
on the other—and providing at least one kind of mediate domain engaging both—was 
the market economy.  In the last chapter we described the campaign‘s implication in 
the ―chronotope of the road‖ at the level of material life.  Here we shall have to show 
whose interests that road connected and where it led.  Not only did the campaign 
ultimately settle—as a union organizing drive is wont to do—in the relations of the 
market economy, but the campaign also built up a novel historical bloc within these 
relations, a widely-dispersed, networked community of interest that, like its discursive 
remnants, survived the bargaining moment. 
The market economy offered one kind of mediate domain in which the 
fundamental dialectical tension between capitalism and material life could play out 
and reach settlement.  It was only one such mediate domain, however, because, as we 
have seen, the tension also played out in political contestation, religious practice
30
 and 
discourses originating in theology (See Chapter 3).  There is some tendency to treat 
the market settlement of social conflicts under capitalism as evidence of their political 
cooptation into the hegemonic relations of contract and market dependence, rendering 
the settlement susceptible to capitalist control.  Ignoring the secondary effects of the 
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 Vis-à-vis commerce and the aforementioned ―chronotope of the road,‖ there 
is perhaps no better example of the campaign‘s confrontation between the ‗religious‘ 
and ‗economic‘ than the March 28, 2006 arrest of 6 clergy and 11 other activists for 
blocking traffic by forming a ‗human chain‘ across U.S. Route 1 (See Chapter 1).   
The arrested clergy were held for several hours in jail for the action (Hawking 2006). 
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conflict, this is a reasonable criticism, but it also emphasizes the tendency of contract 
toward ‗closure‘ to the neglect of what it opens.  What this criticism misses in the case 
of a union organizing drive such as the campaign at UM is that contract and market 
dependence are already facts of life for the workers involved before a campaign 
begins.  The closure of the labor contract has already been achieved under terms that 
are, at least in the U.S., by no means optimal.  These terms typically involve at-will 
employment (i.e. workers can be fired for good reasons, bad reasons or no reasons at 
all) and lack of any independent collective representation.  The trajectory of a union 
organizing campaign is thus not primarily toward contract but first away from it.  The 
campaign makes a substantive intervention vis-à-vis the relations of the market, 
building and drawing upon support from civil society, and when it has built sufficient 
power, it returns to the market for a first settlement with the intention of qualitatively 
and quantitatively modifying the terms of the bare wage relation.  Thus, while a 
campaign such as that at UM is finally conservative of the wage relation—its 
currency—the campaign also opens up the internal terms of the labor contract and, in 
an effort to build political power for bargaining, frequently also opens an ultimately 
unpredictable pattern of broader social contestation. 
 In the first instance, there was a significant dialectical play of difference 
between the capitalist realm of elite actors, and the market economy, worlds Braudel 
never tires of reminding us are quire ―distinct‖ (1984: 620).  This conflict manifested 
in a variety of instances throughout the campaign, as we shall see, but three particular 
relationships provide initial illustration.  We have already discussed the play of tension 
between the emerging international capitalist elite in Miami and the city‘s older 
Cuban-American business elite (Chapter 2) that manifested in a number of key 
instances in which otherwise ‗right-leaning‘ Cuban-American political leaders and 
clergy came to the aid of the campaign in opposition to neoliberal market relations 
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(Chapters 2, 3).  This was an important underlying conflict between capitalist and 
local market relations that helped open the path of the campaign‘s emergence.  A 
second such dialectical tension characterized SEIU‘s very initiation and prosecution of 
an elaborate strategic pressure campaign—planned and coordinated from Washington 
with millions of dollars in investment and national labor contract objectives in mind—
aiming at specific resolution in Miami‘s local market relations (Chapter 2).  There 
would be no reason to assume that SEIU‘s overall national objectives and the 
objectives of local organizers and janitors in the Miami market should be identical or 
even roughly similar, as was demonstrated particularly well by the initial resistance of 
SEIU‘s national leadership to the janitors‘ local choice to launch the hunger strike and 
the janitors‘ insistence on going ahead with it nonetheless (Chapter 1).  It was indeed a 
remarkable dynamic of the campaign that such ‗inter partes‘ conflicts were kept to a 
minimum on the ‗labor‘ side.  A third such dialectical tension involved actual or 
potential conflicts of interests between Shalala and UNICCO, which remained 
relatively quiescent throughout the campaign—in large part due to Shalala‘s virtually 
perfect adherence to neoliberal ideological commitments.  To the extent that this very 
wealthy University might have been expected to defend its reputational and property 
interests and had the ability to pay for higher janitorial wages just as UNICCO was 
attempting to keep its own local and national labor costs as low as possible in a 
relatively competitive market for janitorial services, there was a potentially significant 
conflict of interest that SEIU had hoped to exploit.  Ultimately, SEIU had to force the 
emergence of this particular conflict by radically increasing the potential of the 
campaign to cause reputational harm to UM, leading Shalala to pressure UNICCO to 
agree to the card-check election. 
On the other side of the mediation of the market economy, an increasingly 
profound historical conflict between productive and property relations manifested in 
 74 
the dialectical relationship between the market economy and material life.  The 
dialectical relationship between the (neoliberal) market economy and material life is 
well exemplified by the contradiction at the heart of the Justice for Janitors drive at 
UM, namely between the cost of reproducing the university as a clean space for 
valuable educational activity among economic elites benefitting from the recent 
financial expansion (See Chapter 2) and the cost of reproducing the janitors at a basic 
subsistence level, without health care and in substandard living conditions.  The 
janitors, of course, in the ‗market wage‘ bargain, bore both of these costs, but their 
valuable productivity was divergent with the janitors‘ ‗invisibility‘ (Fischl 2006), their 
mistreatment and endangerment at their campus worksites (Corbishley 2006), and 
their extremely low levels of compensation.  The productive relationship highlighted 
much of what was at stake in SEIU‘s ‗property services‘ campaign in Miami (SEIU 
2009).  The increasing valuation of constant capital coincident with the financial 
expansion and real estate bubble in Miami and much of the U.S. in 2006 did not, of 
course, involve a correlative valuation of the workers‘ variable capital as inputs in 
ongoing production.  Working at a university that charged $29,000 a year in tuition 
and had recently raised $1 billion in a single capital campaign, these janitors were 
contributing to the care and maintenance of a wealthy propertied interest in one of the 
wealthiest enclaves of the United States, but they were driven to find their own living 
arrangements in Miami‘s poorest neighborhoods. 
Finally, there is the matter of the overall mediation of the market economy qua 
meditative domain, which involves the fundamental conflict between capitalism and 
material life, as well as the possibility and salience of resistances arising in the latter.  
As Braudel puts it, ―[t]he economy begins at the fateful threshold of ‗exchange value‘‖ 
(Braudel 1982: 21), on the other side of which lies a whole world of relations in 
tension with capitalism that ‗the economy‘ frequently is called upon to attempt to 
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incorporate, albeit in a relatively uneven fashion.  As Braudel elaborates later, the 
continued existence of a fairly sizeable ‗economia pura‘  or ‗bargain basement‘ at the 
level of material life throughout the world, comprising 30 to 40 percent of economic 
activity in industrialized countries, ―is enough to make one think again before 
assuming that our societies are organized from top to bottom in a ‗capitalist system.‘  
On the contrary, putting it briefly, there is a dialectic still very much alive between 
capitalism on the one hand, and its antithesis, the ‗non-capitalism‘ of the lower level 
on the other‖ (1984: 630, my italics).  This circumstance, as Braudel points out, 
complicates the assumption of any stable relationship between the ‗nodal points‘ of 
the market economy and the ‗non-economy‘ (1982: 21).  The mediation of the market, 
always specific and highly particularistic, is never under the pure domination of 
capitalism.  In spite of all his high structuralist pessimism about the likelihood of 
epochal change, Braudel thus ultimately admits the possibility of resistances entering 
market relations from origins in ‗material life‘ as well as ongoing patterns of 
fundamental dialectical tension seeking mediation by both market and state (1984: 
630-31). 
In the course of its challenge to Shalala and the University, the campaign 
actively built up a novel historical bloc, primarily within the relations of the market 
economy, that contested the hegemony of the neoliberal market bloc.
31
  The latter, the 
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 The bloc contesting the hegemony of the neoliberal market bloc, in keeping 
with Gramsci, in a sense defined itself through the emergent recognition of its 
difference, as a community apart.  Gramsci describes this process it in his notes on 
“The Study of Philosophy” as follows: “Critical understanding of self takes place…  
through a struggle of political „hegemonies‟ and of opposing directions, first in the 
ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a 
higher level of one‟s own conception of reality.  Consciousness of being part of a 
particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political consciousness) is the first stage 
toward a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice will 
finally be one.  Thus the unity of theory and practice is not just a matter of mechanical 
fact, but a part of the historical process, whose elementary and primitive phase is to be 
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neoliberal status quo in Miami, could briefly be described as an Anglo-American 
secular Protestant
32
 cohort guided by instrumental rationality, valuing individualism 
but validating collective conformity in individuation, seeking knowledge at the level 
of the population, and committed to the classic wage relation.  Discursively and 
substantively, the position is well-represented by an early—and entirely prescient—
statement to The Miami Herald from UM vice president of human resources Roosevelt 
Thomas about the janitors working to organize a union at UM: ―They are contract 
employees, not University of Miami employees.  The university is going to remain 
neutral throughout the process‖ (Athavaley 2005).  Thomas, in communicating an 
early version of UM‘s official position of putative ‗neutrality‘ vis-à-vis the organizing 
drive was, in the same breath, effectively advocating laissez-faire in the labor market.  
The university relied upon its contractual relationship with UNICCO to distance itself 
from the matter of how much its janitors were paid, as if the intermediation of the 
subcontractor somehow absolved the university of responsibility for reasonably 
compensating the janitors who maintained the campus.  This was a formalist position 
indeed.  The emergent historical bloc that produced the campaign, however, could be 
                                                                                                                                            
found in the sense of being „different‟ and „apart,‟ in an instinctive feeling of 
independence, and which progresses to the level of real possession of a single and 
coherent conception of the world” (1971: 333).  My—necessarily schematic— 
presentment of the blocs that emerged in the course of the campaign is, indeed, very 
much a part of the constructive process in which my analysis is engaged.  This 
presentation is, in its own turn, inherently open to the possibility of contestation and 
progressive modification. 
32
 My description of these historical blocs is not, it must be emphasized, an 
essentialist description at the level of particular individual actors but a provisional 
structural description of the leading social milieu involved in each case.  Donna 
Shalala, who is Roman Catholic, and Roosevelt Thomas, who is African-American, 
are seen to ‗belong‘ in the Anglo-American Protestant historical bloc in Miami 
because of ‗where they are‘ structurally and culturally.  Likewise, Father Frank 
Corbishley, an Anglican, and Reverend Tim Smiley, a Methodist, are seen as part of 
the broadly Catholic bloc that constitutes the campaign.  What is at issue is not some 
kind of ‗demographic‘ essence but the historically-specific allegiances and politico-
economic orientations of the group of actors in question at the conjuncture narrated. 
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described as a broadly Catholic cohort guided by a substantive valuation of the 
community of the faithful, valuing collectivism but validating differentiated 
individuation, seeking knowledge at the level of the community, and committed to a 
social wage.  A fitting representation of the position emerges in the same early piece 
from janitor Maritza Paz, who made $6.70 per hour at the start of the campaign in 
October 2005.  As Paz observes, ―[w]e need health insurance.  We need to be treated 
as human beings‖ (Athavaley 2005).  Paz‘s explanation of the drive makes a basic 
criticism of the heavily exploitative terms of her labor contract, whatever the market 
may bear and whoever the ultimate payer may be.  These were indignities that called 
out for immediate concern and aid by all parties present, not a distant attitude of 
‗neutrality.‘ 
These typological sketches are not meant to suggest a static ideal-typical 
relation but to stake out and open up the rough field of play within which the historical 
conflict of the campaign—qua ordeal—emerged with social significance in the 
market.  As provisional typologies, these descriptions are intended to help illuminate 
how the phenomenon of the campaign took shape through a discursive economy with 
concrete market relevance, how specific discourse was active in assembling the 
alternative historical bloc and displacing the ruling one.  Thus, in its movement from 
conceptions of ‗clean space‘ to conceptions of ‗sacred space,‘ from understandings of 
UM‘s cleaners as ‗laborers‘ to their acceptance as ‗neighbors,‘ from emphases on the 
efficiency of the ‗market wage‘ to insistence upon the need for a ‗living wage,‘ and 
from the formal enforcement of the ‗wage relation‘ to the substantive recognition of 
‗worker dignity,‘ the campaign mobilized signification within the market toward an 
active politicization of market action.
33
 
                                                 
33
 This signification within the market, it should be noted, involved discursive 
forms, as we saw in Chapter 3, that arose precisely from relations of „material life‟ that 
the momentum of the campaign uncovered.  A discourse of „dignity‟ does not refer to 
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 The building of a novel historical bloc within market relations, however, 
required more than the positing of conceptual and discursive alternatives to neoliberal 
market rationality; it meant that particular (groups of) market actors availed 
themselves to carry and disseminate such alternatives across broader market domains 
in ways that could become materially meaningful.  Each such constituency of the 
campaign, in effect, built up an alternative network from within its preexisting market 
relations in an effort to challenge the legitimacy of the University‘s market 
fundamentalism.  In the specific market actions of the janitors, law professors, 
students, and SEIU itself, the market economy revealed its promise as a channel for 
socially progressive transformation just as market fundamentalism revealed the 
stultifying danger of normative exclusivity.  
 Professors at the University of Miami, in the first instance, initiated the market 
articulation of the campaign through early discussions around the grim news about 
UM disclosed in the August 2001 Chronicle of Higher Education report on UM‘s 
status in a national market for janitorial pay, and they helped extend the campaign‘s 
reach through extensive internet blogging and press communications.  As we saw in 
Chapter 1, the early concerns about janitorial pay and working conditions of 
professors such as Michael Fischl and his colleagues on the UM Faculty Senate 
anticipated the arrival of organizers from SEIU in Miami by some three-and-a-half 
years.  Fischl and his colleagues began petitioning Shalala concerning janitorial pay 
shortly after her arrival at UM as the new president of the University in the summer of 
2001 (Fischl 2006).  Their concerns, as discussed above, stemmed from the Chronicle 
report on national janitorial pay revealing that UM ranked 194th out of 195 
                                                                                                                                            
market rationality, for which it can be cognized as pure nonsense at best or 
propaganda at worst.  The concept of „dignity‟ inevitably entails something more than 
market value, namely a positive experience of responsible engagement with the world 
in its specificity. 
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universities in the U.S. national market (See Chapter 1).  The Chronicle report had, in 
turn, been inspired by the living wage campaign and student sit-ins at Harvard during 
the spring of 2001, a drive that succeeded in obtaining a union contract raising the 
wages of janitors employed there—also, n.b., in a subcontracting relationship with the 
cleaning contractor UNICCO (Boodhoo 2006g).  A market pattern had been 
established.  As Fischl put it, the faculty response to the Chronicle revelation about the 
university‘s ranking was ―mortification,‖ especially in light of the fact that UM was 
also ―one of a dozen schools where janitorial staff actually received less than the 
federal poverty wage‖ (2007: 101, citing Van der Werf 2001: A27).  Alerted to and 
motivated around the national market relevance of the question of janitorial pay at UM 
in the fall of 2001, professors at UM began collecting information on their janitors‘ 
benefits and working conditions that they would use in their unsuccessful early 
attempts to influence Shalala from the ‗inside‘ (Fischl 2006; Fischl 2007). 
In the course of the campaign itself, the professors‘ primary contribution to 
market articulation was through internet organizing.  As Pompele, who was involved 
in the daily maintenance of the campaign‘s blogs and listservs attests, the ―comitato‖ 
of professors coordinating faculty campaign support was involved in a great deal of 
large-scale communication, including its ―Picketline‖ blogspot, its initiation of a 
nation-wide online petition in support of the workers, and its updates to the University 
of Miami‘s Wikipedia entries to describe the strike and ―the conditions that prompted 
it‖ (Pompele 2006).  In addition to posting their own stories and ongoing commentary 
about the campaign‘s developments online (See Chapter 1), the faculty maintained 
frequent correspondence with editors and reporters in the print media (Pompele 2006), 
and Fischl‘s retrospective piece on the campaign ultimately placed the UM faculty 
action in the perspective of an emerging discourse on ―Teaching from the Left,‖ as 
pursued through Fischl‘s participation in a conference series at Harvard Law School 
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and the publication of his piece in the New York University Review of Law and Social 
Change (Fischl 2007). 
The activities of the janitors in the course of their nine-week partial strike were 
enormously responsible for the communication of the campaign at UM across a broad 
network of workers throughout the greater Miami metropolitan area.  One of these 
forms of communication, overtly connected to the ―chronotope of the road‖ described 
in Chapter 3, involved the high visibility of the symbolic embodiments of the 
campaign to a wide diversity of individuals engaged in commercial activity in Miami.  
The workers‘ Freedom City, as we have seen, lay on U.S. Route 1, which runs south to 
Key West and north as far as Fort Kent, Maine.  The encampment‘s signs, soliciting 
drivers to ―Honk for Justice‖ (Ehrenreich 2006), literally articulated the campaign 
with daily commuters passing by the prominent spot by car and with the numerous 
Teamsters and other drivers carrying intermodal containers and other cargo along this 
important route connecting to Miami‘s busy port and airport, both to the north.  Above 
Freedom City in altitude, moreover, was the Miami metro line, which transported 
commuters to and from downtown Miami, Coral Gables and South Miami.  As a 
matter of sheer position, it placed the workers‘ movement in the middle of Miami‘s 
commercial life. 
Strategically, the janitors‘ campaign also remained connected to the market 
economy through its ‗partial strike‘ approach.  Only about 150 of the 400 janitors 
ultimately covered by the final agreement between UNICCO and SEIU were directly 
involved in the strike (Fischl 2007; BNA 2006b).  The other janitors in the would-be 
bargaining unit remained at their jobsites at UM but were by no means quiescent 
during the campaign.  As Michael Fischl illuminates, the janitors at UM were a ―very 
savvy group of workers‖ whose seemingly ―invisible‖ presence on campus was 
deceptive.  In Fischl‘s metaphoric summary of the situation, one advantage of ―life on 
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the bottom of the boot‖ for these workers, was that ―you tend to get to know the boot 
better‖ (Fischl 2006).  By incompletely withdrawing their services from the 
marketplace, the workers as a group held UM in a position of relative dependence 
while making their own market power felt and keeping open their key source of access 
to bargaining intelligence and the machinations of UNICCO‘s anti-union campaign.  
Lastly, the striking janitors communicated their campaign throughout the market 
society in Miami by being practically omnipresent in janitorial workplaces outside the 
UM campus.  Not satisfied merely to organize UM and officially exiled from the 
campus during the partial strike, the janitors, as we have seen (Chapter 1), took their 
campaign to Florida International University, Nova Southeastern University, and the 
Miami International Airport in conjunction with the Teamsters.  This offsite 
organizing work was incessant.  As Hawking recalls, even the memorable festive 
gathering of the campaign‘s main constituencies under the metro tracks (See Chapter 
3), though providing a needed break and dose of pathos for all involved, was followed 
by a trip the same afternoon to the Sunset Place shopping center south of campus, 
where UM‘s janitors had launched yet another attempt to expand their nascent union‘s 
potential influence in the local labor market (Hawking 2006). 
The planning, investment and organizing activities of SEIU and its student 
supporters at UM injected the UM campaign into both the broader pattern of SEIU 
national contract negotiations with UNICCO and a powerful network of solidarity 
involving workers and students at Harvard, student demonstrators at Georgetown, and 
labor unionists in Haiti.  We have already seen that the UM campaign coincided with 
SEIU‘s larger strategy of bargaining a national market contract with UNICCO set for 
renewal in the spring of 2006 (Chapter 1; Amernick 2006), but SEIU and the students 
also connected the campaign somewhat seamlessly with a number of other ongoing 
movements in national and international market spaces.  The first of these, of course, 
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was SEIU‘s ongoing efforts on the campus of Harvard University, whose 2001 
organizing drive was, in part, a model for the UM campaign, having raised janitorial 
wages to $13.50 at Harvard by the end of March 2006 (Boodhoo 2006g).  In an 
attempt to spread the Harvard spirit, SEIU flew Harvard students to Miami, including 
a student organizer involved in the 2001 sit-ins in Cambridge, to engage with the 
student leaders of STAND (Coker-Dukowitz 2006).  The second national movement 
with which SEIU articulated the campaign was student anti-sweatshop activism based 
at Georgetown University.  As we have seen (Chapter 1), in addition to building 
STAND‘s credentials in the anti-sweatshop community, SEIU arranged a trip by 
student activists from Georgetown to UM in November 2005 to school the members of 
STAND in organizational tactics (Bierman 2005).  STAND members also developed a 
relationship with Jack Mahoney, an activist based in Georgetown at the Living Wage 
Action Coalition, which is affiliated with United Students Against Sweatshops 
(Coker-Dukowitz 2006).  Mahoney visited STAND at UM and provided student 
organizing assistance during the latter part of the campaign (Coker-Dukowitz 2006).  
The Georgetown connection became especially relevant at one moment toward the end 
of SEIU‘s pressure campaign against Shalala when the union and students determined 
that Shalala would be at Georgetown delivering a public address.  In an attempt at 
further escalation, STAND and its Georgetown allies arranged for an interruption of 
Shalala‘s event with shouts from undergraduates at Georgetown who bore the ―signs 
of the hunger strikers‖ at UM (Coker-Dukowitz 2006).  But the Georgetown event 
wasn‘t the only such occasion.  The phenomenon followed Shalala offshore to the 
Caribbean.  On March 15, 2006, Shalala was greeted at an address in Haiti—
concerned with Haiti‘s ―health care programs and problems‖ and given in conjunction 
with Dr. Laurie Garrett, who is a Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on 
Foreign Relations in Washington—by a petition from protestors affiliated with Batay 
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Ouvriye, an independent Haitian workers‘ movement acting in solidarity with SEIU 
and the UM janitors (Batay Ouvriye 2006).  In the words of Coker-Dukowitz, ―[s]he 
couldn‘t go anywhere‖ (2006).  One imagines, in any case, that neither event escaped 
the attention of Shalala‘s friend and former colleague Madeline Albright, who is a 
distinguished professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University‘s School of Foreign 
Service, a director of the Council on Foreign Relations and was to be Shalala‘s 
commencement speaker at UM‘s graduation in May 2006 (See Chapter 1). 
The campaign having built up such power within the market economy, the 
union did ultimately settle there.  As described in Chapter 1, the four-year first 
contract ratified by the janitors on August 23, 2006 enshrined a wage increase of as 
much as 51 percent, made available a low-cost employer-sponsored health care plan to 
the workers, and increased paid vacation time (Asher 2006a).  Wages did not rise to 
the ―extraordinary‖ levels of the Harvard janitors, but this was not a meaningless wage 
increase by local market standards (n.b. that median household income was only 
$46,637 in the Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach metropolitan statistical area in 
2006 compared to $64,144 in the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy metropolitan statistical 
area (U.S. Census Bureau)).  More importantly, the deal set the stage for national 
pattern bargaining between SEIU and UNICCO as well as increasing SEIU‘s potential 
leverage vis-à-vis UNICCO‘s main competitors in the cleaning and facilities 
management industry such as ABM Industries, Aramark and Ecolab (Hoovers 2006).  
UNICCO had experienced sales of approximately $700 million in the 2005 fiscal year, 
employing a staff of approximately 20,000, with sales growth of 257.3 percent the 
same year.  This was a rapidly growing privately-held company in a labor-intensive 
industry, and its labor and capital costs certainly came nowhere near $35,000 per year 
per (full-time and part-time) employee in 2006.  Fee increases for clients and profit 
redistribution for UNICCO would not be overly burdensome.  The circumstantially 
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significant but ultimately small portion of capital at stake in the campaign, moreover, 
was indeed entirely disproportionate to its political and social effects.  As Brakken 
endeavored to rationalize the situation, with specific reference to the extreme 
dramaturgy of the hunger strike, ―[a]t the end of the day, janitors don‘t have a lot of 
structural power in the economy.  They have to do other things to win‖ (2006). 
Regardless of the campaign‘s relatively paltry conclusion by market standards, 
what the campaign did do was create a strong precedent, and the discursive power of 
the campaign survived in this precedent as a narrative and form of knowledge borne 
by the open-ended network of institutionally-embedded actors it had engaged and 
inspired.  The campaign laid the foundation of a novel historical bloc in Miami by 
creating a loosely-networked community of actors embedded in specific relations of 
the market society, rooted in deep connections to material life, capable of exercising 
political influence vis-à-vis elite actors, and committed to a social wage.  The message 
of ―worker dignity‖ and the demand by the workers to be recognized ―as people‖ did 
not conclude in a market bargain that made them ―invisible‖ once again but spread—
and continue to spread—in manifold practical and discursive articulations of the 
campaign‘s key actors within a fluid, ‗dialogic,‘ ‗heteroglot‘ and far from definitively 
rationalized ‗marketplace of ideas‘ now opened to the workers‘ subjectivity and their 
belongingness within Miami‘s civil society (Bakhtin 1981; Holmes 1919; Gramsci 
1971).  As testified, moreover, by the strategies, tactics and tropes the union, workers 
and clergy adopted from the history of prior labor struggles (e.g. the tent city, the 
hunger strike, and the deployment of liberation theology), self-consciously echoing 
organizing work as diverse as Caesar Chavez‘s 1968 United Farmworkers Campaign, 
Martin Luther King‘s fateful 1968 intervention in the Memphis janitors‘ strike, and 
indeed, nothing short of the messianic traditions of the Torah and New Testament 
(Hawking 2006; Corbishley 2006; Smiley 2006), the campaign emerged in moments 
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of lucid awareness of its potential historical consequence, as if its key actors were 
tailoring their work‘s chronology and narratives for understanding and redeployment 
in a broader discourse of social contestation.
34
  That continuously emergent discourse, 
with which the present work is articulated, accomplishes the transmission of the 
historical experience of specific social struggles for future work in the democratic re-
appropriation of presence. 
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 In the words of Heidegger, ―the temporality of authentic historicality, as the 
moment of vision of anticipatory repetition, deprives the ‗today‘ of its character as 
present, and weans one from the conventionalities of the ‗they‘…  [W]hen 
historicality is authentic, it understands history as the ‗recurrence‘ of the possible, and 
knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a 
moment of vision, in resolute repetition‖ (1962: 443-44). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
As promised in the first chapter, I return here to a discussion of the 
contribution that my analysis of the campaign may bring to bear on relevant 
theoretical approaches in the traditions of political-economy and critical theory.  As 
mentioned at the outset, I have used this event-level history of the 2006 Justice for 
Janitors campaign at the University of Miami to focus on a set of concrete efforts at 
resistance that both flowed from and locally modified the advancement of neo-liberal 
social policies in greater Miami on the eve of the financial crisis of 2008.  By 
examining the campaign as one localized instance of (resistance to) neoliberal policy, I 
have attempted both to understand the real limits of the latter and to ponder the 
alternatives that may be emerging within its relations. 
My analysis of the campaign has been organized around a Braudelian approach 
to historical structuration, a Gramscian approach to agency, and a Heideggerian 
approach to language.  These perspectives have, in a sense, been chosen to provide 
windows on three ‗dimensions‘ of the campaign‘s historically-specific emergence, 
dimensions that take their place—like any strike or other social movement through 
which they might ramify—in an ultimately open and by no means homogeneous 
fourth dimension that is time (Bergson 1910; Heidegger 1962; Benjamin 1968). 
At each Braudelian layer of analysis—capitalism, the market economy and 
material life—I have described how the campaign built up and articulated a dialectical 
confrontation between the ‗economic‘ and the ‗material‘ (Braudel 1981: 28), rooting 
itself in relations of material life, constituting a politicized network within the market 
economy, and deploying its resources to influence elite actors.  At the latter level, I 
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discussed how the campaign was conditioned by strategies pursued by local and 
national financial and political elites, representing both ‗capital‘ and ‗labor,‘ to shape 
and govern Miami as an emerging ‗global city‘ in the Caribbean Basin.  Next I 
discussed how, in dialectical confrontation with these actors and operating at the level 
of material life, the campaign mobilized a response to such elite processes from a basis 
in the concrete realities of Miami‘s neighborhoods.  Finally, at the level of the market 
economy, I described how the campaign simultaneously settled within and contributed 
to the further politicization of Miami‘s market relations and civil society as a whole. 
Each of these layers of analysis has also been narrated with a view to the active 
processes of immanent contestation pursued by the community of interests 
constituting the campaign.  As I demonstrated in Chapter 4, each of the campaign‘s 
constituencies built up an alternative network from within its preexisting market 
relations in an effort to challenge the legitimacy of the University‘s market 
fundamentalism.  My aim has been to demonstrate how the campaign‘s participants 
built up foundations for potential new ‗historical blocs‘ in greater Miami‘s civil 
society within the relations that were being superseded in historical processes of 
‗destructuration‘ (Braudel 1984: 85), not somehow outside or ‗beyond‘ them (Gramsci 
1971: 459).  Gramsci describes the building of the novel ‗historical bloc‘ as a unified, 
all-absorbing and ‗totalitarian‘ organic process that requires the development of new 
ideational forms in the concrete relations of existing material praxis (1971: 366).  
Structures and superstructures develop together in the new ‗historical bloc,‘ which is 
ultimately a ―complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the social relations of 
production‖ (Id. 366), owing to the concrete historicity of its emergence. 
I have also narrated each layer of my analysis with a view to the role of 
discourse and signification in ‗producing‘ the political and economic outcomes 
achieved.  By ‗production‘ here I have had in mind not a process of active causation 
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but of conditioning through which what is produced ―comes, lighting itself, to 
language‖ (Heidegger 1977: 239).  Production in this sense is thought precisely not as 
a strictly causal action but as a granting of the possibility of a particular kind of 
phenomenal presentment, an opening on the horizon of the real or a letting-be (Id. 
193).  Here, I have aimed to show that the new discourse the campaign introduced—
rooted in a conception of a ‗community of faith,‘ committed to a ‗living wage‘ for the 
workers and demanding a recognition of ‗worker dignity‘—was active in building the 
power of the campaign and disarming that of its adversaries. 
In the end, the campaign suggests that worker-based movements, especially 
when pursued during periods of systemic ‗destructuration,‘ offer significant potential 
to check and even challenge the elite exercise of power if conceived and realized as 
moments of simultaneous economic, political and cultural contestation.  It also raises a 
number of theoretical and practical questions.  These concern the extent of the 
activation or radicalization of relations at the level of contemporary material life; the 
openness of contemporary market relations as a domain of historical change or 
phenomenal emergence; the continued salience of traditions of the past—especially 
those of historical ‗religious‘ practice—as carriers and facilitators of social ‗progress‘; 
and the full potential for discourse to be activated and ‗mobilized‘ across instances of 
demand for social justice, whether contemporaneous or historical. 
Beyond these problems raised, as I concluded in 2008,
35
 ‗practical‘ lessons 
from the Miami campaign can be drawn only in light of the experimentation, 
flexibility, and relentless adaptation that made the campaign possible.  It is unlikely, 
for instance, that, barring the coincidence of a similarly experienced and resourceful 
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 The large part of this final paragraph was first published in the Labor Studies 
Journal in ―Contending Rationality, Leadership, and Collective Struggle: The 2006 
Justice for Janitors Campaign at the University of Miami,‖ © 2008 United Association 
for Labor Education. 
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community of actors and supporters, a hunger strike in the precise manner of the 
Miami campaign could be so effective as to outweigh its risks. The success of the 
hunger strike in Miami was largely specific to the cultural and material circumstances 
of the time and place in which it was enacted, including a community of workers who 
brought direct practical experience in realizing the full symbolic potential of the 
repertoire from relatively recent worker resistances in post-revolutionary Cuba.  While 
it ultimately worked remarkably well under the circumstances, it presented an 
enormous peril to the lives and well-being of the hunger strikers that can by no means 
recommend itself for broad replication. The ‗lesson‘ of the Miami campaign is thus 
much less about what specific tactical repertoires work in a narrow sense than about 
what quality of worker empowerment and creative participation may be necessary to 
generate the broad commitment, community collaboration, and public attention 
requisite for victory.  Practical patterns of constant escalation, diverse tactics, the 
pursuit of influential community alignments, work toward normative coalescence, 
tight coordination, and flexible strategic experimentation are necessary but insufficient 
premises of success. What will work in any specific strategic campaign still remains to 
be discovered in every emergent instance.  In this indeterminacy resides the 
challenge—and, indeed, the good fortune—of social organizing in general.  
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